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 Instability and political repression are two reasons why many states in Africa are unable 
to develop. African regional organizations have the potential to encourage democracy, stability 
and development within their regions if they have the right tools. Using case studies of two 
major interventions by African regional organizations this thesis will determine what those tools 
may be. Both the intervention of ECOWAS into Liberia and the SADC into the DRC were rife 
with problems but they were able to bring some stability and even democracy to states in crisis. 
This thesis finds that African regional organizations can promote democracy and stability, but 
the focus is always on stability for the region. With strong institutions and mandates, policy 
agreement and strong leadership, African regional organizations can bring stability, development 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Liberia was meant to be a new start and a brighter future for former slaves in the United 
States. Yet, instead of being a haven of peace and freedom, Liberia became known for a violent 
civil war that erupted from years of autocracy and repression. The international community 
turned their back on the civil war, leaving one African regional organization with little option but 
to intervene. With no preparation for peacekeeping missions and nothing beyond an economic 
focus, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) embarked on a military 
intervention to return peace and stability to Liberia. In an effort to bring lasting stability, a 
democratic government was created and supported by ECOWAS. This intervention was the first 
time that any economic regional organization intervened militarily in a member state, and it 
raises numerous questions about the potential of African regional organizations to promote 
democracy and stability in their regions.  
Since gaining their independence, numerous African countries have struggled to build 
stable and economically developed regimes. There have been dozens of theories levied by both 
the international community and within African states on how to solve the problem of stalled 
African development. Many African nations do not have the stable democracies that many 
western nations believe is necessary for sustained development. Autocratic and unstable regimes 
are rife throughout the continent and finding a solution to bring about greater stability to these 
states, has led to a focus on African regional organizations.  
Several regional organizations have been created since African states gained 





questions as to whether regional organizations have the ability to promote stability and change 
within their regions. This thesis will begin to answer the question of whether or not African 
regional organizations have the ability to work together to influence change within member 
states and the region as a whole.  
African regional organizations are defined as organizations of states brought together 
with economic and developmental goals, and with a regional component. Both ECOWAS and 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are regional in their design and have the 
goals to promote economic growth, stability and development within their regions.   
 This study will examine whether or not African regional organizations have the ability to 
promote democracy, stability and economic development within member states. Leaders of 
unstable regimes and powerful autocracies are members of these organizations, but the belief 
within African regional organizations is that democracy is the key to development and stability.
1
  
Cases of intervention by the SADC and ECOWAS will be examined to better understand 
whether African regional organizations have the ability to promote stability and democracy 
within their region. The two organizations were started on the principles of good governance and 
economic development. Both of these organizations focused primarily on economic development 
and international trade, but they also promoted democracy, human rights and the rule of law as 
integral to their missions.   
  
 
                                               






 The primary research question is whether African regional organizations have the ability 
to promote stability and democracy. This includes whether regional organizations have the 
ability to directly influence member states and what structures are necessary for this influence to 
be successful. One of the prominent theories regarding regional organizations and their ability to 
promote democracy suggests that only regional organizations with a majority membership of 
democracies will be able to effectively promote democracy.
2
 However, African regional 
organizations have intervened in member states to promote stability and democracy even when 
they have a majority membership of autocracies.
3
 Determining whether or not these interventions 
were successful will be part of the focus of the case studies.  
 If African regional organizations can promote democracy and stability within their 
regions, what resources and structures need to be in place? Does the regional organization have 
to have a certain democratic functioning or do the majority of the states need to have similar 
interests in any situation? In the case of ECOWAS in Liberia in 1990, many states within 
ECOWAS saw intervention as necessary to their own security. With the SADC intervention in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), there was little consensus on the need to intervene or 
the best methods of bringing about stability. Understanding the successes and failures of these 
interventions is pivotal to understanding other interventions by African regional organizations 
and their potential for creating stability and change in the future.  
                                               
2 (Pevehouse, 2002a) 







 The main hypothesis within this paper is that there are three components of regional 
organizations that will increase the chances that a military intervention will lead to democracy 
and stability. The stronger and more prevalent the policy agreement of member states, the 
presence of a single regional hegemon and clearly defined institutions, the more likely that 
interventions and initiatives by the regional organization will be successful. An intervention may 
be successful without all three of these components, but the help of a stronger international 
organization is often necessary.  
 Several assumptions lie within this work and the first is that African states and regional 
organizations prefer stability within the region and within their own state. Often states will make 
decisions based upon their own impressions of what will benefit them. Many ECOWAS 
members feared that during the Liberian civil war the fighting would spread to neighboring 
countries creating greater instability within the region. Both Mali and Niger decided to send 
troops to help the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, on the belief that it would help move 
potential dissident soldiers out of the country.  
 The second assumption is that members of a regional organization support the principles 
of the regional organization that they belong to, at least in regard to the other members. In both 
ECOWAS and the SADC, democracy is one of the underlying principles and goals of the 
organization
4
, and yet we see very few member states run as democracies throughout much of 
these organizations’ histories. However, while states may not be willing to move toward 
democracy within their own regimes, they are willing to promote that within other members, 
                                               





especially among those neighbors that are unstable. ECOWAS in Liberia supported a democratic 
government in Liberia because they felt it was the most likely way to prevent further violence.
5
   
 
Methodology 
 In order to understand how the structures and states within African regional organizations 
work together, both ECOWAS and the SADC will be examined in depth. The creation and the 
protocols of the organizations will be studied to see how the goals of the organization were 
achieved prior to intervention. A closer look at how the member states work together to achieve 
previously agreed upon goals and initiatives will provide insight into to how those states can also 
work together to intervene in states suffering from instability and violence.   
 The interventions of ECOWAS into Liberia will be examined to see not only whether or 
not the organization was successful in intervening, but also the reasons for the intervention. The 
ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was chosen for this study because it was the first intervention 
by ECOWAS and the first military intervention by any economic regional organization. 
Understanding what caused the organization to decide to finally intervene in the severe 
instability of a member state is crucial to understanding the circumstances under which an 
African regional organization will intervene not only politically but militarily in the affairs of 
another state. The crisis in Liberia also pitted the two sides of ECOWAS against each other, as 
the Anglophone and Francophone states fought for power and status within ECOWAS and the 
international community. 
                                               





 The SADC intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo was chosen not only 
because it was one of the first military interventions by the SADC, but also it was one of the few 
interventions by the SADC that involved in some way, all of the member states. Other 
interventions by the SADC were spearheaded or enacted solely by a few states, but the conflict 
in the DRC prompted a response from all members of the SADC. The split on how to handle the 
situation in the Congo was so severe that it threatened to destroy the entire regional organization.  
 An extensive review of previous literature will examine regional organizations and their 
ability to function and create democracy within member states. An examination of the current 
theories on African regional organizations will determine if they have the power or the influence 
to enact lasting change within the region. Following the literature review will be a discussion on 
the methodology used to conduct the case studies. This will include discussions of conceptual 
definitions and databases used in the research. 
 In four sections this thesis will analyze what aspects of African regional organizations are 
necessary for successful functioning and what aspects can be detrimental both to the regional 
organization and the member states. The first section will outline the history and the structures of 
both ECOWAS and the SADC.  
 The next section will detail the ECOWAS intervention into the Liberian civil war. 
ECOWAS was a major player in the civil war until the democratic election of Charles Taylor in 
1997. When instability returned to the region both ECOWAS and the UN returned to Liberia, 
which led to another free and fair election in 2006. The decision to intervene in Liberia was not 
unanimous but ECOWAS was still able to eventually bring stability to the state, with more states 





 The third section details the SADC intervention into the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
The intervention severely split the SADC when President Mugabe of Zimbabwe authorized a 
military intervention into the DRC by the SADC without even consulting the majority of 
members or the SADC chairman. Three states intervened militarily in the DRC; Zimbabwe, 
Angola and Namibia, while the other members of the organization sought a diplomatic solution 
to the crisis.  
 The final section will analyze what structures and aspects of each regional organization 
were successful in the interventions and what aspects were detrimental to the mediations. Both 
organizations had successes and failures because of their interventions but only one paved the 
way for lasting stability. The section will also examine to what extent did the stability and the 
regimes of the member states themselves, affect the ability of the regional organization to 
function.  The extent to which the regional organizations have moved toward stability will also 
be examined to see whether or not membership in the regional organization may have a positive 









CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Despite the preponderance of studies on international organizations, studies on regional 
organizations are less common, and research into African regional organizations even less so. 
Discussions on what areas of policy international organizations have influence on include 
democratic transitions, human rights, resolution of conflict, stability and economic growth. The 
potential connection between membership in international organizations and transitions to 
democracy is the focus of this work, so a thorough understanding of not only the influence of 
regional organizations on member states but also of democratization is essential. 
 
International Organizations 
 The suggestion that regional organizations can prompt transitions to democracy means 
that international organizations may have the ability to influence member states. While there is 
no debate that alliances between states or treaties between states can be created and adhered to, 
as long as all states have something to gain, the idea that international organizations themselves 
can create change is under debate. One of the staunchest critics to the potential influence of 
international organizations on their member states has been Mearscheimer. In a realist view on 
international organizations, Mearscheimer argued that international organizations are nothing 
more than mirrors of the international system.
6
 They are a different manifestation of the balance 
of power and that anything done by an international organization could have just as easily been 
done with an alliance between several states with similar national interests.   
                                               





 If the realist view presented by Mearscheimer is true then what reason do states have to 
work through international organizations at all? For the past several decades, most interactions 
between states have involved some form of international organization. Abbott and Snidal argue 
that international organizations do offer more than simple alliances or the balance of power. 
States can use international organizations to provide a stable negotiating forum for interactions 
between states, to manage joint operations, provide a sense of norms for the community, and 
perhaps most importantly, to provide neutrality.
7
 In several interventions led by the ECOWAS 
and the SADC, regional hegemons chose to work through the regional organization in order to 
give their operations neutrality. Nigeria used ECOWAS to gain allies for the Liberia 
intervention, and for the intervention to appear neutral, rather than as a military invasion by 
Nigeria. 
 Abbott and Snidal argue that there are significant benefits to states working through 
international organizations to achieve their goals. For organizations such as ECOWAS and the 
SADC there is also an economic benefit, through trade relationships, to being a member. These 
benefits may give international organizations the ability to influence policy within member 
states. This occurs when the member state has something to lose if they are rejected from the 
organization. If the benefit of staying in the organization is greater than the cost of conforming to 
the policy mandate of the organization; the member state is likely to conform. It is this logic that 
might explain why Russett and Oneal found that states that have economic trade relationships are 
less likely to fight each other and states that are members of international organizations are less 
likely to fight each other.
8
 The benefits of remaining a member of good standing within the 
organization are higher than the cost of not engaging in conflict with another member state. 
                                               
7 (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, pp. 10-23) 





Conversely, if an organization pushes an autocracy toward democracy, the costs of remaining in 




 Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom found that intergovernmental organizations have the 
ability to reduce the likelihood of conflict among member states, exacerbate the likelihood of 
conflict, or have no effect on conflict, depending on the strength and prevalence of certain 
components. The likelihood that member states within a regional organization decreases with 
higher the levels of institutionalism and member cohesiveness and if the organizational mandate 
addresses security concerns.
10
 Hansen, Mitchell and Nemeth also found that the more 
institutionalized the organization, the more likely it was to settle disputes and the less likely it 





  While international organizations can decide to suspend a member state from the 
organization if they do not conform to organization mandate, the international organization may 
also choose to intervene. Intervention and peacekeeping operations are another way that 
international organizations may prompt transitions to democracy within member states. Fortuna 
found that intervention into conflict ridden states by the international community is more likely 
to lead to peace and that peace is more likely to last.
12
 Despite the likelihood of promoting peace, 
Bueno de Mesquita and Downs found that military intervention was unlikely to lead to 
                                               
9 (Schimmelfennig, 2007, p. 137) 
10 (Boehmer, Gartzke, & Nordstrom, 2004, p. 29) 
11 (Hansen, Mitchell, & Nemeth, 2008, p. 29) 





democracy, especially if the intervention was led by an autocracy.
13
 They even go as far as to 
argue that autocratic states would not support democratic transitions following a military 




Research by Van de Leuten and Hoffman on what causes 
international organizations to intervene found that democratic organizations were more likely to 
intervene in states where democratic principles were violated. However, in cases where the 




 African regional organizations are in areas where development and civil liberties are 
often limited or even nonexistent. Therefore, the potential of regional organizations to not only 
bring economic development to the region, but democracy is intriguing. Do African regional 
organizations have the institutions in place to be able to influence policy within member states or 
can they perform interventions that not only bring peace but democracy as well?  
 
Democratization 
Studying democratization has become more and more sophisticated throughout the years. 
Through these studies one common trend has surfaced, the correlation between democracy and 
economic development.
17
 What is under debate is whether or not development is causation or 
correlation to democracy.  Prezeworski et al. found that there was no link between levels of 
economic development and transitions to democracy.
18
 Their findings were disputed by Boix and 
                                               
13 (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006, p. 647) 
14 (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006, p. 643) 
15 It is important to note that the focus of Bueno de Mesquita and Downs’ research is on an individual intervener or 
intervention by the UN Security Council, and not on interventions by a regional or international organization. 
16 (Van Der Vlueten & Hoffmann, 2010, p. 754) 
17 (Geddes, 2007, p. 318) 





Stokes, who found that economic development does contribute to democratic transitions, with 
the level of development being extremely significant for predicting democratic transitions prior 
to 1950, and only slightly significant post-1950.
19
 Epstein et al. present a middle ground, where 
development can be linked to democratic transitions in states that are partial democracies (Polity 
IV score of +1 to +7), but development has less effect on transitioning full autocracies (Polity IV 
score of 0 to -10) to full democracies (Polity IV score of +8 to +10).
20
  
The link between development and democratic transitions can help explain why African 
states turned toward democracy after periods of instability. As Epstein et al. suggest it was as the 
power of the autocracy declined and the level of development rose, that democratic transitions 
were most likely. For ECOWAS states there was a period of instability in the late 1990s, where 
many authoritarian regimes were struggling to maintain power and were steadily going through 
periods of development. In every state that experienced this weakening of the state and building 
of development, instability followed and that was in turn followed by democracy. This was true 
regardless of whether or not ECOWAS intervened.  
Another prospect toward democratization especially in Africa is the connection with the 
gap between rich and the poor and democratic transition. This gap is more striking in African 
states than perhaps anywhere else in the world, where elites in Zaire in the 1990s, were among 
the richest men in the world at the same time that the majority of the country lived in dire 
poverty. Under this theory the rulers present aspects of democracy in order to coerce the 
population into agreeing to higher tax rates in return for liberalization. Since it is easier for an 
authoritarian regime to collect taxes on a consenting public, they are likely to offer representative 
                                               
19 (Boix & Stokes, 2003, p. 531) 





institutions in order to increase tax revenue.
21
 The same is true in cases where the population can 




The problem with these models is that they require mobility of capital in order for the 
elite rulers to move toward democratization on their own and that democratization must always 
be elite-led. Within Africa, transitions to democracy often follow periods of political instability 
in which rebel groups rise up against the elite-run government. Rarely have authoritarian leaders 
willingly given up control of the government. Burton, Gunther and Higley address this concern 
by identifying the leaders of the opposing groups within the state as elites themselves. Once they 
rise to the head of an opposition group, they are among the elite and it is therefore a negotiation 
between the old and new elite that leads to democracy.
23
  Rustow makes a similar argument 
stating that democratization occurs when there is conflict between opposition groups and an 
authoritarian regime, notably those which include conflict between old and new elites.
24
  
Other studies of democratization include models which search for simple links between 
elements of democratization, but there is as of yet no universal explanation of what leads to 
democratization. Acemoglu and Robinson present a model in which nondemocratic countries are 
ruled by a rich elite and that the poor can rise up at times when opportunity cost is low, such as 
during a recession. The uprising can force the elite to move toward democracy to prevent 
revolution while still consolidating power.
25
 Zak and Feng present a model in which the 
determinants of democratic transitions were per capita income, distribution of wealth, 
                                               
21 (Bates & Lien, 1985, pp. 64-65) 
22 (Geddes, 2007, p. 326) 
23 (Burton, Gunther, & Higley, 1992, p. 4) 
24 (Rustow, 1970, pp. 352-357) 





educational levels and strength for political preferences and civil liberties. Their model predicts 
the chances of a democratic transition at any point in time. This model is useful for studying 
African transitions because it not only takes into account aspects of development but the political 
preferences and desire for civil liberties of the people within the state. In 1999, the Zak and Feng 
model predicted that the democratic prospects were not high for Zaire, Malawi, Angola, Guinea, 
Togo, or Niger.
26
 Their predictions proved to be true as only Zaire (now the DRC), Malawi and 
Niger are currently moving in the direction of stable democracy and Niger’s regime has changed 
frequently over the years.
27
  
The democratization process is a multi-faceted process but most importantly for the case 
studies and the organizations that follow, is the perceived link between development and 
democracy. As these economic organizations were formed with a desire to promote 
development, there was an understanding that this would likely lead to democratic transitions. 
The link between opposition elites and democratic transitions will also be useful in explaining 
how the instability within Africa led to a wave of democratization, especially within ECOWAS.  
Yet, there is a final facet of the democratization process. Pevehouse argues that 
democratization can come from membership within democratic regional organizations. His 
model shows that states who are members of an organization in which a majority of the states 
have a Polity IV score of +6 or higher, are likely to transition to democracy.
28
 This outside-in 
approach, if true, can provide a way for poor, underdeveloped countries to transition to more 
democratic regimes without the struggle of increased development or violent transition. Putting 
                                               
26 (Zak & Feng, 2003) 
27 (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011) 





Pevehouse’s theory into the context of African regional organizations is the inspiration for this 
research.  
 
African Regional Organizations and Democracy 
 The existing research into African regional organizations is limited to analysis of 
different aspects of attempts at intervention. The focus of these studies rests on the success or 
failure and what led to the end result. Few studies have been presented on the strength of the 
organization itself to promote democracy, either through its institutions or intervention. There 
has also been limited discussion on what institutions and structures within African regional 
organizations are needed to promote democracy both through peaceful means and through 
intervention. The purpose of this thesis is to help fill some of the gaps in African regional 
organization research. 
 While the research by Pevehouse did not directly address African regional organizations, 
the research by Olonisakin and Levitt did. They found that it was democratic transitions within 
member states that prompted the creation of stronger and more democratic institutions within 
ECOWAS and the SADC.
29
 Therefore, the institutions would only be strong enough to influence 
transitions to democracy after states had already transitioned to democracy. The more democratic 
the member states became, the more changes occurred to the institutions within the regional 
organizations. This suggests that democratic transition in African states may be a bottom-up 
approach through development and elite confrontation as other research into democratization 
                                               





processes has presented. Tsie had similar findings in that the institutions within the SADC were 
not strong enough to promote democratic transitions within the region.
30
 
 Zartman found that regional hegemons, working through regional organizations, were 
more likely to be the method of conflict resolution in Africa over the Organization of African 
Unity/ African Union (OAU/AU). Regional hegemons in Africa, while stronger than other states 
in the region are still relatively weak and therefore need the support of other states within the 
regional organization. Also working through the regional organization lends legitimacy to the 
actions taken by the hegemon while still allowing the hegemon to have most of the control over 
the intervention.
31
 This was seen in the intervention into Liberia by ECOWAS and the 
intervention into the DRC by the SADC.  
 Aning found that the security mechanisms within ECOWAS are weak and largely flawed. 
While the focus on good governance, democracy and stability are essential for West Africa’s 
future, the organization currently lacks the capacity to deal with the current problems facing the 
region. Aning proposes a four tier system with complete oversight over policy and objectives, 
operations and tactics only under the purview of key personnel, and with the inclusion of civil 
society organizations to act as additional oversight and counteract the suspicion between 
“political and security elites.”
32
 Aning’s analysis of the structures needed to create a stronger 
collective security system within ECOWAS is a start to understanding the key structures needed 
for both the SADC and ECOWAS to effectively promote democracy and stability within their 
regions.  
                                               
30 (Tsie, 1996, pp. 85-86) 
31 (Zartman, 2003, p. 100) 





 As these organizations are still new it will take more research to understand what impact 
they have had on the development and democratic transitions of their regions. Continuing 
research will be able to determine the role that these organizations will have with recent changes 
to structure and regarding new intervention efforts. This thesis intends to add to the dialogue of 







CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 
With limited research on African regional organizations and a substantial need for 
progress within African states, extended research into what role African regional organizations 
play is necessary for understanding the best way forward. If African regional organizations have 
been successful in moving states in conflict toward stability and democracy, then current 
operations by these organizations may also have the potential for success. Research by 
Pevehouse and his colleagues has shown that regional organizations in other areas around the 
world have been able to promote transitions to democracy, provided that the membership of the 
organization is mostly democracies.
33
 Yet, when ECOWAS and the SADC were formed they 
existed with a large majority of autocracies, and still intervened in states and promoted 
transitions to democracy. Today both these organizations have a majority membership of 
democracies, understanding the role that ECOWAS and the SADC played in these transitions to 
democracy can provide new insight into top-down approaches to democratic transitions.  
 Due to the fact that there has only been limited research into the link between African 
regional organizations and democracy and stability within member states, case studies were 
chosen. Using case studies will allow for a deeper understanding of the potential causes of these 
interventions and transitions to democracy and the role that African regional organizations 
played. It also gives an opportunity to understand other factors that may have influenced the 
actions of the regional organizations. Using comparative analysis between the two major case 
studies will allow for a greater understanding of how changes in structure, member cohesion and 
dominant players affect the ability of the regional organization to be successful in their goals.  
                                               





 The purpose of this research is to understand the conditions under which African regional 
organizations are successful at promoting democracy and stability through intervention. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that intervention by African regional organizations into states in 
conflict will be successful if the intervention is led by an organization with majority agreement 
on policy concerns, includes the support of a regional hegemon and that the organization has 
strong, clearly defined institutions.  While it is not necessary for an intervention to have all three 
components to move a state toward stability and democracy, the more present and prevalent 
these conditions the more likely the intervention will be successful and that stability will last.  
 Mill’s Methods of Agreement and Difference allow for situations to be examined in a 
way that determines the conditions that are sufficient for a certain effect. Using case studies that 
contain some aspect of each method of the hypothesis and case studies that do not have some 
aspect of the hypothesis, the causal factors that are sufficient for a successful intervention are 
determined. By studying the causal factors that are present or missing from each intervention the 
importance and the necessity of each causal factor can be determined. Case studies were found in 
which each causal factor in the hypothesis were present or missing, with the exception of the 
presence of strong, clearly defined institutions. This missing factor will be discussed later.  
 Using Mill’s Methods of Agreement and Difference several cases of intervention by 
African regional organizations were studied to understand the causal factors to success in 
intervention. The cases allow for study of policy agreement and the presence of a hegemon. 
However, there have not yet been any cases of intervention by ECOWAS or the SADC in which 
strong, clearly defined institutions were present. Currently both organizations have strengthened 
and defined their institutions, so future research into the current interventions by the SADC and 





 To understand the link between policy agreement and the success of intervention, the 
common goals and national interests of the majority of ECOWAS states in Liberia is studied. 
The SADC intervention into the DRC provides an opposite example in which a majority of states 
within the organization did not agree on the type of intervention, nor were the goals of 
intervention similar. Conversely, there is a brief look into the SADC intervention in Lesotho, in 
which a majority of SADC states were united in values and national interests toward the 
intervention.  
 To understand the importance of a regional hegemon, the intervention of ECOWAS of 
Liberia shows the effect of one dominant hegemon on an intervention. Conversely, the 
intervention of ECOWAS into Guinea-Bissau is briefly examined as that intervention did not 
have a dominant hegemon. In terms of the SADC, the intervention into the DRC had two 
competing hegemons, while the intervention into Lesotho had two hegemons working together. 
These case studies provide a strong foundation for understanding the importance of a regional 
hegemon throughout the intervention process.  
 For the importance of strong and clearly defined institutions both the SADC and 
ECOWAS did not have the strong institutions needed in any of their past interventions. While 
they were able to achieve some level of success without this component, the interventions were 
rife with problems that could have been remedied with better institutions. For the ECOWAS 
interventions, there was no security structure or protocol in place prior to the intervention in 
Liberia. For the SADC, there was a security structure in place but it was not under the control of 
the main body of the SADC, nor were there protocols for its management. Both situations 
created very different problems for the organizations that were only overcome by the control of a 





 The case studies control for membership as neither organization was controlled by a 
majority membership of democracies at the time of Liberia and the DRC. ECOWAS was 
dominated by autocracies. However, the SADC was mixed with 5 states as established 
democracies, 4 as anocracies and 2 autocracies.  Zimbabwe was an autocracy and a regional 
hegemon and fought for dominance with the other regional hegemon, South Africa, a democracy. 
Economic development is controlled as both countries had economies that were collapsing at the 
time of intervention.  In 1988, the GDP growth rate of Liberia was -2, and the GDP growth rate 
of the DRC in 1997 was -5.
34
 Both countries experienced drastic declines in growth rates in the 
following year when conflict broke out. The GDP per capita in current US dollars of Liberia in 
1988 was $474 while the DRC had a GDP per capita of $131.
35
 While there is a disparity in the 
GDP per capita and the GDP growth rates in the year prior to the outbreak of war, both countries 
had low levels of development and economies that collapsed when war broke out.  
 The economy, regime and stability of Liberia and the DRC are examined in the case 
studies to determine if the conditions within the state were the cause of the success or failure of 
the interventions. The strength and number of rebel groups is also explored as a potential reason 
for the success or failure of intervention, as well as the handling of the military and diplomatic 
aspects of the interventions.  International support from other states and organizations is also 
examined as a potential cause of the success or failure of the interventions. 
 The success of intervention will be measured in terms of democracy and stability. For the 
purposes of simplicity and clarity, democracy will be defined by a +6 to +10 Polity IV score. 
Autocracy is defined as -6 to -10. These benchmarks were chosen to exclude anocracies which 
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fall between these scores and focus on states at one extreme end of the spectrum or the other. 
Polity IV takes into account both democratic and autocratic aspects of government to define a 
scale of -10 to +10 with -10 being the most autocratic and +10 being the most democratic. Polity 
IV categorizes democracies on the basis of three elements: presence of institutions and 
procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences, the existence of 
institutionalized constraints on executive power, and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens 
in their daily lives and in participation in political activities.
36
  Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index and Mo Ibrahim rankings will also be used to determine the quality 
of democracy for each state following intervention. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks 
states based on public perceptions on corruption using polls and drawing on corruption related 
data.
37
 The Mo Ibrahim index is an annual assessment of African governments; it consists of 88 
indicators drawn from 23 independent international data providers.
38
  
 Stability will be defined as a state that does not pose a threat to the region, either through 
conflict spillover, economic collapse or refugees. This will include a state that is threatened by 
an internal or external violent force or a state that is suffering from a severe economic crisis. It 
can also include a state that drastically violates the protocols and mandates of a regional 
organization, which threatens the stability and the reputation of the regional organization. If a 
state is in severe violation of the principles of a regional organization and the regional 
organization does not act, its reputation and influence within the international community is at 
risk.    
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 An intervention will be considered successful if there is democracy and stability in the 
state following the intervention. It is important to note that length of the intervention is not 
discussed as a contributing factor to the success or failure of the intervention. As some 
interventions may take more time than others and some may be more difficult than others, it is 
hard to measure failure in terms of a long intervention process. However, reasons for a lengthy 
intervention will be discussed to see if they are contributing factors to the decisions made by the 
regional organization on how to proceed. 
A brief look into other interventions by the SADC and ECOWAS, as well as one case of 
non-intervention by the SADC, will offer a more complete picture of African regional 
organizations and interventions. Looking at the other interventions will clarify the two cases 
studied in depth, by examining the effect of changes in regime, hegemon influence and policy 
agreement on intervention success. 
Following the case studies there will be comparisons between the ECOWAS and SADC 
interventions and conclusions drawn to determine the main goals of the member states of the 
regional organization and whether or not these goals were accomplished. The link between 
democracy and autocracy and the link between democracy and economy will be discussed to see 
how they interact with the goals of the members within a regional organization. Finally the case 
studies will be compared to see what aspects of ECOWAS and SADC institutions and values 
were necessary for a successful intervention and what institutions and values were missing in 










 The Economic Community of West African States was formed in 1975 following an 
initiative by General Gowon of Nigeria and General Eyadema of Togo. General Gowon and 
General Eyadema began traveling to West African states in 1972 to present the idea of a regional 
trade agreement. When the final draft of the Treaty of ECOWAS was signed, there were 15 
signatories. The fifteen original ECOWAS states were Benin, Burkina Faso (then known as 
Upper Volta), Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Two years later in 1977, Cape 
Verde joined ECOWAS. The organization remained at 16 members until 2000, whaswaen 
Mauritania left in order to focus on their membership in Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), believing 
that their interests would be better protected in the UMA.  
 ECOWAS was formed with the intention of promoting cooperation and integration with 
member states, as well as the eventual creation of an economic and monetary union. The overall 
goal was to create collective economic self-sufficiency among member nations through the 
creation of an economic and trading union. The optimism that created ECOWAS did not last as 





decades of existence. The lack of progress and initiative can be linked to economic, cultural and 
political factors that affected both individual states and their ability to work together.
39
  
 In 1975, Nigeria was the powerhouse within the region and continues to be so today. 
Nigeria maintained a population and Gross National Product that far exceeded that of any other 
ECOWAS state, a fact which continued to be true throughout the Liberian crisis.
40
 The strength 
of Nigeria played a major role in the working of ECOWAS, as several West African states 
continue to suffer from extreme poverty and low rankings in human development. The vast 




The division between English speaking and French speaking states also created a problem 
for ECOWAS. The nine Francophone and five Anglophone nations continued to harbor tensions 
toward each other, as outgrowths of their colonial experience.
42
 In order to promote unity within 
the organization, French, English and Portuguese were all adopted as official languages. The 
chairmanship of ECOWAS also alternated between the Francophone and Anglophone states. 
This cultural division played a major role not only in the decision to intervene in Liberia but also 
how the intervention was managed. The divisions made it hard for some states to trust the 
dominance of Nigeria within ECOWAS and they feared that Nigeria would take over full control 
of the organization and the intervention. 
 The final obstacle for ECOWAS was the political instability within many of the member 
states, few states maintained stable regimes and were often occupied with problems within their 
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own states. Throughout the first decades of its existence, few ECOWAS countries had stable 
democracies or even stable autocracies. This prevented the states from being able to focus on 
ECOWAS or creating a true regional trading bloc.  
 
Structure of ECOWAS 
 ECOWAS has a very specific structure that has changed slightly over the years as the 
organization has adjusted to the growing needs of the region. The ultimate authority is the 
Authority of Heads of State and Government of Member States. Comprised of the heads of state 
of all the member states, the Authority controls the general guidelines and goals of ECOWAS 
and gives directives. The Authority meets once a year in order to oversee the functioning of 
ECOWAS institutions and the implementation of ECOWAS objectives. It also decides whether a 
matter should be handed over to the Community Court of Justice, appoints the Executive 
Secretariat (changed to a Commission with a President in 2006), and adheres to all other powers 
granted to it by the Treaty. The ECOWAS Treaty (also known as the Treaty of Lagos) was 
signed on May, 28, 1975, and established guidelines for cooperation and integration in order to 
create an economic and monetary union. The ultimate goal of the treaty was to create economic 
growth and development in the region.  
 The Executive Secretariat used to be named to four year terms and could only be re-
elected once. The Secretariat was the head of ECOWAS and was responsible for ensuring that 
the organization remained true to the Treaty under which it was formed. The Commission now 
consists of President, Vice President and seven commissioners. This allows for greater control of 





Commission adopts Rules for the implementation of Acts enacted by the Council. These Rules 
have the same legal force as Acts enacted by the Council. The Commission makes 
recommendations and gives advice. Recommendations and advice are not enforceable.”
43
 
 The Council of Ministers is another institution within ECOWAS that is comprised of a 
minister in charge of ECOWAS affairs and a Minister appointed from each member state. 
Previously the Council decided on recommendations for the Authority that would help meet the 
obligations and goals of ECOWAS, and then these recommendations would be decided on by the 
Authority.  
 In 1999, ECOWAS also created a Community Court of Justice. This court will hear 
complaints from member states and ECOWAS institutions, and concerns of member states 
relating to defaulting states. The Court consists of a president, chief registrar and seven judges. 
ECOWAS also has a Community Tribunal which interprets the Treaty and handles any disputes 
by member states which are referred to it.  
 The ECOWAS parliament is the largest body of ECOWAS and consists of 115 seats 
divided up between all the member states according to population. The parliament acts as an 
advisory board with regional executives making referrals of issues to the parliament. The 
parliament consists of the plenary, the bureau, the conference of bureau and parliamentary 
standing committees.  
 The ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), also known as The Fund, 
supports projects geared toward improving the infrastructure and economic development of West 
African states. The Fund also works to increase investment to the region and hopes to become 
                                               





the premier finance bank in the region for investment and financing of special projects to 
alleviate poverty and generate wealth and development.
44
 
 There are also a number of commissions and specialized agencies geared toward 
addressing specific problems and initiatives within the region.  
 
ECOWAS Over Time 
 
Figure 1 ECOWAS Regimes over Time 
Democracy defined as +6 or higher in Polity IV data. Autocracy defined as -6 or lower in Polity IV data. 
Transition defined as -66,-77, or -88 in Polity IV data. 
Source: (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011) 
 
 
At its inception in 1975, ECOWAS was an organization of autocracies, with 13 out of 16 
states ranking as established autocracies (-6 or lower on Polity IV).
45
 This is surprising 
                                               




















considering the ideals of good governance and democracy under which the organization was 
founded. The status of autocracy dominance did not change until a period of instability which 
began in 1989, the same time as the Liberian civil war. The entire region was on the crux of 
instability which was one of the reasons why the organization felt it necessary to intervene in 
Liberia to prevent the entire region from falling into chaos.  
 However, several states would follow Liberia into civil war and ECOWAS later 
intervened in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau following the Liberian intervention. While the 
period of instability severely threatened the region, it also spurred a massive transition to 
democracy. In only 12 years ECOWAS went from an organization run by a majority of 
autocracies to being an organization run by a majority of democracies. The transitions to 
democracy continued and in 2011, nine out of 15 states are established democracies, with several 
more headed toward democracy. The dominance of democratic governments has allowed the 
organization to grow and restructure to try and reach a position of greater power and influence 
within the region.  
 The above chart shows the progression of ECOWAS from an organization dominated by 
autocracies to one with a majority membership of democracies. The chart also shows that at the 
time of the three major interventions by ECOWAS the organization was dominated by 
autocracies. Even the regional hegemon, Nigeria, which was the driving force behind the 
Liberian and Sierra Leone interventions, was a firmly established autocracy. 1991 was the 
pivotal year for ECOWAS. The number of states in transition spiked as several autocratic states 
experienced strong challenges to their authority. Following 1991, the number of autocratic states 
continues to decline while democratic states continue to rise. The instability in the region created 
                                                                                                                                                       





a wave of democracy throughout the region in a desire to bring stability between old 
governments and rebel uprisings.  
 ECOWAS has become one of the most powerful and influential regional organizations in 
Africa because of the relative stability of its member states. The SADC is moving toward greater 
influence and strength within the region like ECOWAS, but they continue to be held back by 





 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) began in 1980 with several 
newly independent southern African states wanting to create their own sub continental regional 
entity. They formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 
order to promote regional integration and decrease the dependence on apartheid South Africa. 
The original members were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. A decade later, the organization realized that no progress had 
been made. It was not an effective instrument for economic integration due to several 
shortcomings within the structure of the organization and the inability to mobilize resources 
within the region for development.
46
 The SADCC accomplished the creation of a regional 
identity, which brought the states together to reorganize the SADCC in 1992.  
 The Treaty of the Southern African Development Community was different from the 
SADCC in four ways: the first was that the mandate now included political and security 
                                               





concerns, South Africa was allowed to join, and that it was created to be an international body 
with a legal persona, and the Treaty and all protocols were meant to be binding on all member 
states. The region would have to strengthen itself both economically and politically if it was ever 
to become a real influence in the international community.
47
 
 The new SADC placed a great weight upon the necessity of rule of law, democracy, 
peace and security, solidarity, human rights and balance and mutual benefit. The new 
membership, which now included Namibia and South Africa, were brought together during an 
era of change. Several of the region’s countries had moved toward democracy, prompting the 
belief that other member states would soon follow. However, the growing instability within the 
region and the organization itself would come to a head in the mid-1990s. All the hopes with 
which the SADC had been founded were quickly threatened by disagreements over how to 
handle the growing number of conflicts within the region.  
 Following the struggles and division of the 90s, the SADC revised their 1992 treaty in 
2001. The most important change to this treaty was the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security 
was placed under the control of the Summit, the highest governing body in the SADC. 
Previously the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security had been its own entity and deployed 
military action and made decisions on behalf of the SADC without consulting the Summit or all 
of the SADC members.
48
 That same year the SADC worked to create a free trade area, 
combining efforts with the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market of Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 2008. The SADC now consists of Angola, Botswana, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
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Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Seychelles. Madagascar is currently 
suspended following the 2009 coup d’état.  
 
SADC Structure 
 The highest governing body of the SADC is the Summit. The Summit consists of the 
heads of state for each member. There is a chairperson and vice chairperson which are rotated 
annually among member states. Directly under the Summit is the Council of Ministers. The 
Council plays an advisory role to the Summit, oversees the implementation of SADC policies, 
and the execution of its programs and the functioning and development of its organization. The 
three other main SADC institutions are the Standing Committee of Officials, which offers 
technical advice to the Council, the Tribunal, which handles disputes, and the Secretariat. All 
SADC institutions are required to make decisions by consensus and quorum for meetings of the 
institutions is 2/3 of the member states.  
 The SADC has protocols on several objectives including peace and security, 
infrastructure and services, science and technology and politics, diplomacy and international 
relations. The SADC decided to use sectorial co-ordination to achieve its objectives, with 
individual states being responsible for the co-ordination of the various sectors. The result proved 
to be very inefficient and ineffectual.
49
  As of 2001 there were 21 sectorial coordinating unites 
and commission in 12 countries. 
 The only sector that was not placed into the hands of a single state was the sector on 
politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security. This was turned into a central 
coordinating body which would be chaired by member states on a rotating basis. There were few 
                                               





instructions given for how this would be run or what authority was granted to the chair of the 
sector. This would eventually become the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Co-Operation.  
 The lack of true policy agreement within the SADC have prevented it from being 
effective in addressing the number of violations by member states in regards to democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law. The different national interests, levels of development and 
regimes, caused for significant differences in beliefs over how the SADC and regional security 
should be controlled. There are enough consensuses to work together on functional areas but it is 





SADC over Time 
 
Figure 2 SADC Regimes over Time 
                                               

























































 Democracy rated at +6 or higher Polity IV score. Autocracy rated as -6 or below Polity IV score. Transition 
rated at -66,-77, or -88 Polity IV score. Madagascar included for 2005-2009. Seychelles is excluded for lack of 
Polity IV data, but the country is understood to be relatively democratic.  
 Source:(Marshall & Jaggers, 2011) 
 
 The Southern African Development Community was formed during a period where many 
of the states were moving toward democracy and autocracy was on the decline. However, the 
SADC still struggles to have a majority democratic membership even in 2011. Many states 
remain in transition, and Swaziland remains a strongly autocratic regime despite the values of the 
organization.  
 However, the focus of the SADC has not been as much on the political and peacekeeping 
needs of the region. Instead, the modern focus of the SADC has been on the economic needs and 
development of the region, believing that development will bring forth the democracy and 
stability that the organization supports. New partnerships to create free trade zones and build a 
strong economic and investment sector within the region have been the main objectives.  
 The SADC has taken steps against Madagascar following the 2009 coup d’état. They 
have not only suspended the state from the SADC, but they have attempted to intervene with 
peacekeeping forces. The SADC has been the most successful in the past in terms of 
peacekeeping. There were struggles in both Lesotho and the DRC, with the different states 
within the SADC not able to work together or agree on appropriate actions in these two 
interventions. 












CHAPTER FIVE: ECOWAS AND THE LIBERIAN CRISIS 
 
Background to the Liberian Crisis 
 The Liberian crisis stemmed from the very beginning of Liberia’s history. Liberia was 
founded as a place for freed slaves from the United States to start a new life on their own in 
Africa. There were several freed slaves who decided to start over in Liberia and they created a 
new government that placed them in control. The Americo-Liberians allowed themselves to have 
complete control over the wealth and power in Liberia, even though they made up only 5% of the 
population. The rest of the population consisted of the people that were indigenous to the area.
51
  
 There are 16 major groups of indigenous Liberians and 31 different languages spoken 
within the country. By 1971 4% of the population controlled 60% of the country’s income, and 
                                               





that 4% were all Americo-Liberians.
52
 On April 12
th
 1980, the repression of the indigenous 
Liberians came to a head when Samuel Doe led a successful military coup against the Americo-
Liberian government. As a member of the Krahn ethnic group, the people of Liberia hoped that 
he was their answer to years of repression.
53
  
 However, Samuel Doe found that at 26 years of age, it was hard to maintain the respect 
and authority needed to govern a country and make the necessary changes for a more egalitarian 
society and government. It was not long before it was clear that Doe’s government simply placed 
a new ethnic group in power. Government repression and corruption were common and Doe 
made sure to give government and military positions to members of his Krahn ethnic group. By 
1985, there was no free speech and no political parties allowed. All political opponents to Doe 
and his government faced death or imprisonment.
54
  
 In 1989, a rebellion led by Charles Taylor moved against Doe’s government. Calling 
themselves the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) they spurred the first Liberian war. 
They started their campaign in Nimba and Doe responded by attacking Nimba and killing 
civilians. Doe’s response caused many to side with Taylor and his forces quickly grew. Within 
months, Taylor’s forces controlled large portions of Liberia and were ready to move on the 
capital. President Doe appealed to neighboring countries for help against the insurrection and 
received support from Nigeria. Taylor on the other hand, received support from Cote d’Ivoire 
and Burkina Faso. 
 Both sides used ethnic rivalries to increase the tensions.  President Doe killed Gio and 
Mano groups and Taylor killed Krahns and Mandingos. Both sides attacked and killed civilians 
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with little mercy, causing the war to receive international attention. However, the United States 
was occupied with the Gulf War and the rest of the international community felt that there should 
be an African initiative to stop the bloodshed.
55
 With a lack of response from the international 
community, ECOWAS members decided that it was time to step in.  
 
Reasons for ECOWAS Intervention 
 The intervention of ECOWAS into the Liberian crisis was unique and unexpected on a 
number of fronts. This intervention was the first time that an economic regional organization 
intervened militarily in an internal crisis. Another surprising factor was that many ECOWAS 
governments were unstable and feared their own coups and insurrections. Within the years of the 
Liberian crisis, six out of sixteen ECOWAS governments would experience periods of transition 
or interregnum (scores of -88 and -77 on Polity IV) and only 3 were considered stable 
democracies.
56
 When the organization decided to intervene there were more autocracies than 
democracies and yet there was still an initiative to promote democracy within Liberia.  
 Despite the lack of a democratic majority within ECOWAS, the organization still took 
the initiative to promote democracy. Pevehouse suggests that democracies want to promote other 
democracies because it lends legitimacy to their own regime, but there is no suggestion of the 
reasons why an autocracy would want to push another state toward democracy. In the case of 
ECOWAS, there is significant evidence that the reasons for intervention in Liberia were due to 
individual state interests, rather than an organizational initiative to promote democracy. While 
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democracy in Liberia eventually became the goal of many states within ECOWAS and of 
ECOWAS itself, a transition to democracy was never a main initiative in intervention.  
 The major force behind the intervention in Liberia was Nigeria which was expected for a 
number of reasons. Nigeria was the richest country in ECOWAS and it had previous experience 
working with UN peacekeeping missions. Nigeria also had the most advanced military and the 
resources to spare in order to intervene in Liberia.
57
 When it came time to send troops and 
money, Nigeria sent more than all the other ECOWAS countries combined. Despite the expected 
reasons for why Nigeria would be the lead on any intervention performed by ECOWAS, 
Nigerian leaders had their own reasons for intervening.  
 The Nigerian government wanted to prove itself as the regional hegemon both to 
ECOWAS and to the rest of the international community. Promoting stability and ending the 
bloodshed were the reasons that Nigerian leaders used when convincing ECOWAS to intervene 
in Liberia in order to end the war and restore stability. The focus was always on stability and 
never on the necessity of promoting democracy. It later became the opinion of many states, 
including Nigeria, that democracy in Liberia was the most likely way to create stability between 
the government and the rebel groups.  
 There was also a need for retaliation in response to the murder of hundreds of civilians as 
they hid in the Nigerian embassy. At the outbreak of the war there were more than 70,000 
Nigerians living and working in Liberia.
58
 When the Nigerian president Ibrahim Babangida 
answered President Doe’s request for assistance, the Nigerians living in Liberia became targets 
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of Taylor’s National Patriotic Front for the Liberia (NPFL). On August 8, 1990, the NPFL 
attacked the Nigerian embassy, solidifying Nigeria’s need to intervene.  
 President Ibrahim Babangida also saw an opportunity to gain allies because of the threat 
of regional instability. The countries of Gambia, Sierra Leone and Guinea were close to Liberia 
and were not only receiving refugees but also had members of their populations join Taylor’s 
forces. There was a growing fear that the civil war in Liberia would spread to these neighboring 
countries.
59
 President Babangida needed their support to help against the growing criticisms of 
the international community on the human rights abuses and political repression in Nigeria.
60
 
Nigeria was under fire for the problems within its own state, so they hoped that making a good 
show in Liberia and having the support of neighboring states would allow the international 
community to continue supporting Nigeria. 
 Ghana also supported intervention in Liberia for two reasons, like Nigeria there was 
concern for the 10,000 Ghanaians living in Liberia at the time of the war.
61
 There was also the 
growing concern over the number of Liberians that were seeking refuge within Ghana. The 
Foreign Minister of Ghana maintained that the ECOWAS intervention should only be performed 
if it was for the good of the membership of ECOWAS. He maintained that the thousands of 
Ghanaians, Nigerians and other nationals that were suffering in Liberia due to the war, were the 
sole reason why ECOWAS needed to intervene.
62
 Ghana proved to be the only country that 
contributed troops that had no direct political benefits to gain from the outcome of the war.  
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 Guinea and Sierra Leone were the first countries to band together with Nigeria in support 
of intervention. Both countries had been the recipients of thousands of refugees and worried 
about their internal stability. Guinea and Sierra Leone maintained that intervention was 
necessary to ensure not only stability within Liberia but stability within their own states.
63
  
 Mali and Togo were not directly affected by the crisis in Liberia and were therefore wary 
of providing troops toward a peacekeeping mission.
64
 Neither Togo nor Mali opposed 
intervention outright but were not willing to send troops. In 1991, a change of government in 
Mali caused a change of heart as the new President Alpha Omar Konare was an advocate for 
regional peace and stability. He also hoped to maintain stability within his own country by 
sending away the troops that were supporters of the previous regime to Liberia.
65
  
 There was also strong opposition to invention in Liberia but in some cases the opposition 
was overpowered by the voice of Nigeria, and in others the leaders of the opposing states 
changed their minds. Both Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire believed that intervention by 
ECOWAS would be an over extension of its mandate, citing the Organization of Africa Unity 
(OAU) charter and the ECOWAS Treaty on state sovereignty. However, privately it was known 
that Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire supported the Taylor regime.
66
  President Compaore of 
Burkina Faso eventually changed his position when he prepared to be chairman of the OAU. He 
knew that as leader of an organization that promoted peace, he could not support the violent 
rebellion in Liberia.  
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 Niger and Senegal were also wary of intervention in Liberia and turned their attention 
elsewhere at the onset of the intervention. Niger was experiencing internal unrest and therefore 
could not spare any troops for Liberia. That would change when, like Mali, the new President 
Ibrahim Bare used the Liberian crisis as a way to move potentially threatening troops out of the 
country.
67
  Senegal would change its position under pressure from both the United States and 
Taylor. The United States could not spare the resources to intervene during the Gulf War, but 
offered to provide financial support for any peacekeeping mission by Senegal in Liberia.
68
 
Taylor believed that Senegal would help make the intervention more neutral, as he did not trust 
the Nigerian dominated force.
69
 The first troops from Senegal arrived in October 1991 and 
Niger’s troops arrived in 1997. 
 Zaire and Ethiopia supported the intervention on the hopes that this would keep the 
United Nations from intervening in the situation. Zaire and Ethiopia were under pressure from 
Nigeria to support the mission. Both countries also feared that UN involvement in Liberia would 
set a dangerous precedent if their own unstable regimes should come under attack.
70
 Thus, the 
majority of countries that supported the intervention in Liberia did so because of instability 
within their own states and instability within the region. The importance of domestic stability 
and regional stability differed for each member state. For the states that chose to send troops to 
Liberia as a method of removing potential dissidents from the country, domestic stability was the 
main concern. For states like Nigeria with a strong autocracy, the greater concern was stability 
for the region. There was very little true humanitarian focus, but rather a focus upon what Liberia 
would mean for the tenuous control the other leaders had over their states.  
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  The process of ECOWAS intervention began in 1990 when pressure from Sierra Leone 
and Guinea to intervene led to the creation of a Standing Mediation Committee. The committee 
consisted of representatives from Guinea, the Gambia, Mali, Nigeria and Togo who were tasked 
with finding a peaceful solution to the crisis. The Standing Mediation Committee attempted to 
arrange a peace agreement but was daunted by the refusal of Doe to step down and Taylor’s 
factions were not interested in negotiating for peace. The SMC also imposed travel restrictions, 
froze assets, and restricted the use of sovereign territories by the rebel forces, but these methods 
failed to bring about a peace agreement. In July 1990, despite some opposition, the ECOWAS 
Defense committee created a plan for military intervention in Liberia.  
 The intervention was justified based upon the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense 
which was adopted by ECOWAS in 1981. This protocol allows ECOWAS to intervene in any 
internal armed conflict within a member state if the conflict is likely to endanger the peace and 
security of the region. The protocol allowed for a community army of troops to be formed from 
national units in order to militarily intervene in an internal situation. General Erskine of 
ECOWAS stated that “with the crisis in Liberia creating unbearable refugee problems for Sierra 
Leone, Ghana, the Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire, it is obvious that the situation in 




 The Monitoring Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOMOG) was deployed in Liberia in August of 1990. Their mission was to include the 
imposition of a ceasefire, the disarmament of the warring parties, end the violence, impose an 
embargo on the acquisition and import of guns, establish an interim government and prepare for 
                                               





elections and the evacuation of all foreign nationals.
72
 The entrance of ECOMOG into the 
country escalated the violence and the conflict.  
 
ECOMOG in Liberia 
 The ECOMOG forces were composed of 3,500 troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, 
Sierra Leone and the Gambia. The forces were led by Lt. General A. Quainoo of Ghana in an 
attempt by Nigeria to show that they were not trying to dominate the ECOMOG force.
73
 Upon 
landing in Liberia, ECOMOG forces quickly took control of the capital of Monrovia. At this 
point the NPFL had splintered and a new rebel group, the INPFL (Independent National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia), formed causing Charles Taylor to have a war on two fronts. Along with the 
INPFL, Taylor also had to contend with the leftover forces from the dissolved Armed Forces of 
Liberia (AFL). The government’s standing army continued to fight on behalf of Doe and the 
government, even after Doe was no longer in power. However, that did not stop Taylor from not 
only increasing the violence upon the arrival of ECOMOG but attacking the observer group as 
well. ECOMOG was forced to go on the offensive to protect themselves and Monrovia. The use 
of force by ECOMOG against the NPFL changed the purpose of ECOMOG from a peacekeeping 
force to a peace enforcement force.
74
 
 The first major problem for ECOMOG came in November 1990 when INPFL forces 
broke through the ECOMOG containment and kidnapped President Doe. The leader of the 
INPFL, Prince Johnson, filmed the torture and murder of the Liberian president. This 
embarrassment caused Lt. General Quainoo to be replaced by a more experienced Nigerian 
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leader, and it would be Nigerian leaders that would control ECOMOG for the rest of the 
intervention. The event also spurred ECOMOG into action and an interim government was 
quickly set up in Monrovia. The government was disputed by Taylor who argued that it would 
not be legitimate since NPFL forces controlled the majority of the country, and the NPFL was 
not a part of the new government.  
 ECOMOG was eventually backed into a corner of increasing their military capacity and 
going on the offensive against the INPFL and the NPFL in order to protect the capital and the 
new government. The problems that ECOMOG faced were compounded as the rebel groups 
continued to splinter and new ones entered the country. In June of 1991, the United Liberation 
Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) entered the country and began attacking NPFL 
forces. This group was formed from former Doe supporters and members of the Liberian army 
who had fled the country. This group would eventually split like the NPFL into two separate 
factions the ULIMO-K (led by Kromah) and the ULIMO-J (Led by Roosevelt Johnson). The 
AFL was also known to fight along with ULIMO forces as they often had the same objectives. 
With several active fronts within the country and each rebel group unclear about what it was they 
wanted in a new government, few of the peace agreements forged by ECOMOG were successful.  
 ECOMOG itself struggled to maintain control in Liberia and follow through on the 
mandate it was given. However, there was no direct link between the ECOMOG forces and there 
were few political directives given to the forces from ECOWAS. There was not even a 
mechanism in place to hold ECOMOG accountable to ECOWAS, so the force commanders 
controlled the military and the political aspects of the operation.
75
 There was not even an 
ambassadorial group to help forge the peace agreements. The forces were also too small to 
                                               





maintain firm control over the region and move beyond Monrovia. They suffered from a lack of 
funds and a lack of direction that prevented them from being successful in Liberia from the start. 
However, ECOMOG did provide a sense of stability within the capital and opened the doors to 
peace agreements.  
 In 1992 the NPFL was losing territory to the ULIMO forces and decided to stage an 
attack on ECOWAS. Taylor’s goal was to either defeat ECOMOG or cause enough damage for 
them to leave Liberia. Operation Octopus was a full scale attack by the NPFL on Monrovia and it 
caught ECOMOG completely off guard. It was nearly a week before ECOMOG responded by 
bombing NPFL targets, ULIMO forces and former members of the Liberian army came to the 
aid of ECOMOG.
76
 By the time a ceasefire was called, about 3,000 lives had been lost in the 
attack and ECOMOG’s neutrality was called into question.  
 Not only did the NPFL continue to doubt the neutrality of ECOMOG but the international 
community did as well. Former President Jimmy Carter of the United States questioned the size 
of ECOMOG, its neutrality and the number of arms under its control.
77
 Within ECOWAS, 
Burkina Faso spoke out against the continued attacks of ECOMOG against the NPFL. ECOWAS 
formed a Committee of Nine, consisting of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, the Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo to monitor the implementation of the peace 
agreements. The Committee decided that ECOMOG had the right to defend itself against 
continued attacks from the NPFL but that there would be a ceasefire on the 10
th
 of November 
1992. The Committee also invited a representative from the United Nations to aid the peace 
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process. The decision by the committee was a compromise between the Francophone countries 
that wanted to mediate the crisis and the Anglophone countries that wanted a military response.
78
 
 In 1993, the Contonu Peace Agreement was forged in Monrovia, setting up a coalition 
government between the interim government set up by ECOMOG, the NPFL and Doe’s 
remaining supporters. In order to enforce the agreement, ECOWAS called upon the help of the 
United Nations to enforce and monitor the conditions of the peace agreement. The United 
Nations deployed the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), a group of over 
300 observers who would be under the protection of ECOMOG.  
 The enforcement of the Contonu Peace Agreement was slow as the rebel factions were 
not fully committed to the agreement. The matter was further complicated by the influx of two 
new groups, the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) led by George Boley and the Lofa Defense Force 
(LDF). Neither of these groups had signed the Contonu Peace Agreement and they moved on 
NPFL forces, causing Taylor to be reluctant to comply with the peace agreement. ECOMOG and 
UNOMIL attempted to forge new peace agreements but the situation had deteriorated into one of 
warlords simply looking to add territory to their own claims of power.  
 After renewed struggle, the ECOWAS chairman Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings 
called the leaders of the three main rebel groups in Liberia to Akosombo. The negotiations 
included Taylor of the NPFL, Kromah of the ULIMO-K, and General Bowen of the AFL. The 
peace agreement set up a new power sharing government between the warlords, which appeased 
those in attendance. However, several factions were not represented and continued fighting, 
including taking over the territories of the factions who did attend the peace talks.  
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 Peace talks were restarted once again in Abuja and this time all the factions were 
represented. The war weary factions were losing ground and their forces were ready to end the 
fighting. The new peace agreement set up another power sharing arrangement between the 
warring factions with the intent to set up elections in August of 1996. However, this plan failed 
when fighting once again broke out between factions of the UNLIMO-J. ECOMOG troops and 
the interim government subdued the fighting and the elections were scheduled for May 1997.  
 During this time ECOWAS sought out the help of the international community with the 
rebuilding and the restructuring of the Liberian government and infrastructure. The United States 
decided that it would help with the process despite its displeasure at the state of domestic politics 
within the military regime of Nigeria. The European Union also pledged its support to the Abuja 
peace agreement and offered support to ECOMOG. The support and the additional funding and 
troops for ECOMOG allowed the disarmament to begin and for there to be enough forces to 
create real stability within the state.   
 Charles Taylor pushed a strong campaign for the 1997 elections and he was the most 
well-known candidate in Liberia. He gained large support, to the surprise of many. One political 
saying was “He killed my ma, he killed my pa, still I will vote for him.”
79
 ECOWAS supported 
Charles Taylor for President of Liberia because they felt that was the only way to ensure that 
there would be no more fighting and the ECOMOG troops could pull out.
80
 The international 
community however feared that with Taylor in power, there would not be a liberal democracy. 
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The elections were held in May 1997 as planned, and both ECOWAS and UN observers found 
the elections to be free, fair and transparent.
81
  
 The international community called upon ECOWAS to continue to work toward 
rebuilding and restructuring Liberia. The organization was tired of the war and was eager to 
bring their troops home, but the success of the elections led them to commit to leaving troops for 
another six months. While publically ECOWAS promised that the rebuilding of Liberia was the 
goal of the new government, privately ECOWAS believed that it would be up to other members 




Democracy Before and After ECOWAS Intervention 
 
Figure 3 Liberia Polity IV 
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Polity IV (2) changes values of -66,-77, and -88 to common Polity IV values. -77 is 
marked as 0, -88 is prorated across the span of the transition.  
Source: (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011) 
 
 Liberia faced a rocky beginning following the election of President Taylor. For several 
years, Taylor ruled with an iron fist that was similar to that of President Doe. He was known for 
human rights abuses and filling the government with only his key supporters.
83
 In 1998, he 
ejected ECOMOG from the country and refused their involvement in Liberia. This changed 
when more rebel factions entered Liberia in 1999 and 2002. These factions quickly took control 
of the country and put Taylor on the defensive. Once again ECOWAS troops with the help of the 
UN intervened and a new peace agreement was in place in 2003. In October of 2003, the UN 
took over the peacekeeping operations from ECOWAS, but continued to use ECOWAS troops. 
By 2005 another round of free and fair elections took place. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was 
elected and has since tried to lead Liberia down a path of peace and stability.  
 Prior to the intervention of ECOWAS, Liberia had a Polity rating of -6.
84
 Even though 
President Doe took over the government with the promise of creating an equal and democratic 
Liberia, what really happened was far from it. In 1983, copies of the new draft constitution were 
everywhere as Liberians were asked to read it and relay any concerns.
85
 Posters were found in 
every town asking the citizens to do their duty as Liberians and improved the new Liberian 
constitution. There was hope within Liberia and the international community that a true move 
toward democracy was on the horizon.  
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But as Doe moved to consolidate power he killed many of his rivals and sent several 
others fleeing into exile, including Prince Johnson and Charles Taylor, future leaders of the 
NPFL. The United States and other allies convinced Doe that moving to civilian rule would be 
the best way for him to stay in power, by doing the same that other military dictators in Africa 
had done.
86
 To this end, Doe formed his own political party and used all the government 
resources at his disposal to recruit supporters to stand against any who opposed him. His support 
was limited to the few he had put into power, his tough and brutal tactics had lost him the 
support he had gained at the start of his military rule.
87
  
The 1985 presidential election was blatantly rigged and there was little dispute by any 
observers of that fact.
88
 His unpopularity within Liberia forced Doe to claim that he had won 
only 50.9 percent of the vote, a low number for an election that was so obviously rigged. 
However, the United States chose to recognize the election as legitimate and that Doe was now 
the rightful President of Liberia. This move by the United States was strategic as the Cold War 
continued; Liberia was a strong foothold for the United States and the Central Intelligence 
Agency. It was necessary to keep ties strong, which meant that no matter what offenses Doe 
committed or promises he broke, he continued to have the support and aid of the United States.
89
  
A month after the elections, Quiwonkpa, a former supporter and friend of Doe who 
helped with the 1980 coup, returned to Liberia after being scared into exile. He entered through 
Nimba County with the hope of pulling off another successful coup attempt.
90
 There was 
widespread jubilation at Quiwonkpa’s entrance into Monrovia, but Doe was prepared. The 
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United States had already informed him of the pending coup, allowing Doe to summon enough 
troops to defeat Quiwonkpa and his soldiers.
91
 The coup attempt caused Doe to go on a brutal 
rampage against any who were thought to be supporters of Quiwonkpa; including residents of 
Nimba County, those that cheered at Quiwonkpa’s arrival and anyone with any suspected tie to 
the rebel force. An estimated 1,500 people lost their lives in the aftermath.
92
 
There was no restraint on Doe’s power. Even as the United States realized that Doe was 
squandering the aid that was being sent to Liberia, there was little that could be done to stop him. 
The United States even sent a team of accountants to try and keep track of the money, but Doe 
was able to easily outsmart them. By 1986, the country was spiraling downward. A report by the 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights found that brutality, executions, political detentions and 
abuse of free speech were the cornerstones of the Doe regime.
93
 Teachers went on strike and 
members of the army grew largely unhappy as their salaries were withheld for months and up to 
80% of their income was taken as taxes to the government.  Political detentions without due 
process became common as students, journalists, teachers and any opposition figures were jailed 
with no word on the chance of release.
94
  
The lack of restraint on the executive and the lack of civil liberties placed the Doe regime 
as a firm autocracy. When Charles Taylor was elected president in 1997 in elections that were 
widely considered free and fair by a number of international observers, ironically it brought a 
new era of repression for Liberia rather than democracy. By 1998, there was widespread fear 
throughout Liberia as Taylor went on a rampage against anyone associated with his old rival 
Roosevelt Johnson. Government road blocks were set up to capture anyone of the same ethnic 
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 Counselor Tiawan Gongloe was a human rights lawyer in Liberia in 2002 
when he spoke out against Taylor’s government. Taylor responded by having him brutally 
tortured.
96
 Taylor also gained international condemnation when he jailed four journalists working 
for Britain’s Channel 4 news. The journalists were working on a widely known story of Taylor 
trading diamonds from rebels in Sierra Leone for weapons.
97
 In 2012, Charles Taylor was 
convicted of war crimes for supporting the brutality of the rebel troops in Sierra Leone; he was 
given a sentence of 50 years.
98
  
UN and ECOWAS peacekeepers returned to Liberia in 2005 to bring stability to the 
region after insurgents entered the country once again causing Taylor to flee to Nigeria. By 2006, 
the country went through another round of free and fair elections. Liberia elected the first female 
African president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Taylor’s major competitor in the 1997 elections. 
President Sirleaf has been re-elected in subsequent free and fair elections and Liberia is now 
considered to be an established democracy.  
Under Sirleaf foreign debt has nearly been eliminated and the country reports annual 
growth rates of 6.5%.
99
 However, there have been some concerns over nepotism and corruption 
as Sirleaf appointed three of her sons to top positions in the government. While Sirleaf admitted 
that corruption was rife within her country, the appointments she made were on the basis of 
merit.
100
 There were also concerns of land deals made to outside investors, where land was taken 
from the community and granted to foreign companies. Some reports say that Sirleaf’s 
government turned over more than a third of Liberia’s land. The Sirleaf government has 
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promised to stop all public land sales and look into the issue, promising that any unfair deals 
would have the land returned to the community.
101
   
While there have been a number of problems within the Sirleaf government, they have 
been minor compared to the brutality and repression of the past. A 2009 human rights report 
found that there was still violence in Liberia, poor prison conditions, reports of detention without 
due process, and government restriction of the press. There have been no reports of politically 
motivated killings and any incidences where the military or army has participated in an unjust 
killing have led to arrests. There have been no politically motivated disappearances, and torture 
by the government has been outlawed by the constitution. There have been some reports of 
military and police using torture, and trial by ordeal continues to exist in rural areas.
102
 
Liberia has a long way to go to be truly peaceful and stable, but in just a few years Sirleaf 
has done a great deal of work in healing the wounds created by decades of conflict. 
 
Other ECOWAS Interventions 
 The fear that Liberia would cause instability within the region was not unfounded as in 
the following years ECOWAS would intervene in both Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. The 
intervention in Sierra Leone was much like the intervention into Liberia with Nigeria taking the 
lead and ECOMOG being rife with logistical and financial problems. When Nigeria moved from 
an autocracy to a civilian democratic government it could no longer play a major military role in 
ECOWAS peacekeeping efforts. It pulled out of Sierra Leone, leaving the rest of the process to 
the UN, and did not provide troops for the intervention into Guinea-Bissau. These two 
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interventions had very different results, largely due to the decreased presence of Nigeria 




 The Sierra Leone war occurred partly as an outgrowth of the Liberian crisis. Disaffected 
youths in Sierra Leone formed the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and were joined by rebels 
from Charles Taylor’s NPFL in March of 1991. The reason for the support of the NPFL was that 
Taylor warned that Sierra Leone would experience their own “taste of war” for their support of 
ECOMOG in Liberia.
103
 Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea all sent troops to help the government fend 
off the rebels in fulfillment of a mutual defense pacts that had been signed.  
 The poorly trained and poorly equipped Sierra Leone army could not defend against the 
rebels and a military coup occurred in April 1992, under the leadership of a former ECOMOG 
soldier.
104
 The formation of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) put the country 
under relatively stable if corrupt governance. The NPRC drastically increased the army, even 
hiring soldiers from South Africa to fight and push out most of the RUF in 1995.
105
  
 In January of 1996 another coup, led by Julius Maada Bio ousted the NPRC. Bio staged 
the coup after speaking with Nigerian officials and learning that Nigerian troops would not stand 
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in the way of the coup. International pressure caused Bio to hold democratic elections in Sierra 
Leone, and in March Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected.
106
  
 In 1997 elements of the Sierra Leone Army, led by Johnny Paul Kromah, rose up against 
Kabbah. Following the coup against a democratically elected government, the Nigerian chairman 
of ECOWAS, sought diplomatic measures to force the military junta to step down and for the 
democratic government to be returned to power. The international community refused to 
recognize the military junta and continued to view Kabbah as the rightful leader of Sierra Leone.  
 Kromah refused to work with ECOWAS in July 1997, stating that he would not be forced 
back into a civilian government. In August 1997, ECOWAS ministers recommended that the 
troops from ECOWAS countries within Sierra Leone be referred to as ECOMOG II. The talks 
between ECOWAS and Kromah were criticized for being unilateral, with Nigeria not consulting 
other members of ECOWAS about the negotiations.  
 The conflict came to a head when Nigerian troops in the capital attacked the military 
junta in February 1998.While the initiative led to Kabbah being returned to power in March 
1998, the unilateral action by Nigeria was frowned upon by some members of ECOWAS and the 
UN. However, Nigeria supplied about 90 percent of the troops in Sierra Leone with small 
numbers of troops coming from Ghana, Guinea and Mali. Benin, Gambia, Cote d’Ivoire, and 
Niger all promised troops to the mission but they never arrived. Therefore, even though Nigeria 
continued to be seen as a bully hegemon with the Sierra Leone intervention, as they did in 
Liberia there were few others willing to put forces and finances toward the mission. 
                                               





 Many of the same problems that plagued ECOMOG in Liberia continued in Sierra Leone. 
There were few operational and logistical mechanisms for the peacekeeping forces; there were 
not even enough bilingual officers to effectively run the entire force. There were ill feelings 
toward Nigerian dominance that caused divisions within ECOWAS which prevented the 
peacekeeping force from having the full support of the organization. Nigeria would often push 
aside the attempts of other states to take leadership roles within the intervention or the diplomatic 
proceedings, causing anger and distrust for the hegemon.  
 Nigeria had several reasons for wanting to be a major force in Sierra Leone. The 
intervention allowed Nigeria to put off substantial sanctions against its own regime. The 
international community had been threatening severe sanctions against Nigeria for human rights 
abuses and for the repressive regime. One of the reasons why Nigeria did not stop the coup 
attempt by Bio was because the leader of the NPRC had voted to censure Nigeria at the 
Commonwealth summing in Auckland. The censure vote was in response to the hanging of nine 
environmental activists by the Nigerian regime. The continued international efforts of Nigeria 
acted as a sleight of hand trick, where the international community would look toward the 
intervention efforts of Nigeria and ignore the actions of the repressive regime. 
In turn, Nigeria also wanted to restore democracy to Sierra Leone as a way to bolster the 
image of Nigeria and to gain with the international community.
107
 The intervention into Sierra 
Leone was also another step in Nigeria’s quest to be seen as a regional hegemon. There were also 
personal reasons for the intervention, as corrupt generals and even Abacha himself was able to 
redirect millions of dollars into private funds while billing them as ECOMOG expenses.
108
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Another invasion by RUF occurred in January 1999, and Nigerian troops were once again 
forced to fight back to bring stability to Sierra Leone. However, the Nigerian forces received 
strong criticism for using their own brutal methods against the rebels. A ceasefire was signed in 
May 1999, and called for disarmament and for the RUF to become a political party. The 
agreement allowed for the new government to be split being the warring factions and would be 
overseen by the UN, the OAU, the Commonwealth and Togo. The agreement was far from ideal 
but it was becoming clear that Nigeria was no longer willing to commit troops.  
In August 1999, Nigerian President Obasanjo (elected in May 1999 in democratic 
elections) wrote to the UN, stating that Nigeria would be pulling troops out of Sierra Leone. The 
new democratic, civilian government had too many internal problems to continue the estimated 
U.S. $1 million a day mission in Sierra Leone. The UN reluctantly took over the ceasefire and 
found the task daunting as several of the UN’s own managerial problems prevented a proper 
response. In 2000, ECOWAS agreed to send 3,000 troops to help the UN forces. Disarmament 
was completed in 2002, and parliamentary and presidential elections occurred that same year, 
with Kabbah being re-elected president. Another round of elections occurred in 2007, and Sierra 





 The intervention into Guinea-Bissau was unique for ECOWAS in that it was the first 
intervention that did not include Nigeria in a leadership role. The hegemon was still struggling to 
overcome internal issues with its fledging civilian government. Nigeria also refused to be a 
                                               





major financial or military backer for the intervention, which left the entire operation to other 
ECOWAS states for the first time.
110
  
 The conflict in Guinea-Bissau began in 1998 when President Joao Bernardo Vieira 
accused his army chief of staff, General Ansumane Mane of providing arms to secessionists in 
Senegal. Mane denied the charges and was not only replaced but Vieira attempted to have him 
arrested.
111
 A report was released in April 1999 that not only exonerated Mane, but implicated 
Vieira as the one trafficking arms.
112
  
 Mane’s treatment led to a coup attempt and the establishment of a military junta. Mane 
was very popular among the army as he always fought for better conditions for his men and for 
Vieira to pay their delayed salaries.
113
 Mane’s popularity meant that most of the army defected 
and joined Mane’s rebellion, forcing Vieira to hire young men to fight on his side, sometimes 
even underage boys. Both Senegal and Guinea intervened militarily on the side of Vieira, and 
Vieira was urged to seek ECOWAS support.
114
 
 ECOWAS support came immediately with Vieira’s request. This was due largely to the 
lack of a Nigerian dominance in the intervention, but also because there was strong camaraderie 
between Senegal, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau and other ECOWAS heads of state. This is in 
contrast to the Liberian intervention where Samuel Doe was not well liked by the other 
ECOWAS heads of state. By October 1998, a Committee of Nine was established to address the 
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situation in Guinea-Bissau. Nigeria refused to contribute troops despite Vieira personally 
requesting Nigerian assistance because Nigeria’s resources were already overstretched.
115
 
 Nigeria did play host to a peace accord and the Abuja agreement was brokered in 
November 1998. Despite the peace agreement and preparations to deploy peacekeeping 
observers to Guinea-Bissau, fighting once again broke out in January 1999.
116
Problems with 
communication, logistics and finances once again created delays and problems for the ECOMOG 
forces. Once ECOMOG arrived in Guinea-Bissau they were shackled with poor equipment. 
Vehicles were constantly breaking down and there was a lack of radios which meant that troops 
could not patrol very far from headquarters.
117
  
 Problems continued as Vieira refused to abide by the terms of the ceasefire, causing 
Mane to rally his troops to fight against Vieira again in May 1999. ECOMOG troops did nothing 
to stop this round of fighting, allowing Mane to take control and force Vieira out of the country. 
Soon after ECOWAS condemned the coup but stated that ECOMOG would withdraw from 
Guinea-Bissau in early June 1999. This was due to the deteriorating situation in Guinea-Bissau 
and the financial and logistical problems that ECOMOG was experiencing.
118
  
 Elections were held in November of 1999, electing President Kumba Yala. September 
2003 saw another military coup and a round of legislative elections occurred in 2004.
119
 This was 
followed by military mutiny and another round of presidential elections in 2005.
120
 This time 
                                               
115 (Adebajo, 2002, p. 118) 
116 (Adebajo, 2002, p. 120) 
117 (Adebajo, 2002, p. 123) 
118 (Adebajo, 2002, p. 124) 
119 ("Army Ousts Leader of Guinea-Bissau," 2003) 





President Vieira was re-elected and served until his assassination in March 2009.
121
 In June of 
2009 the military allowed for another election to be held this time with Malam Bacai Sanhá 





 The Liberian intervention showed that Nigeria was necessary as a major player in 
ECOWAS affairs, despite the anger of Nigerian dominance in other member states. Nigeria’s 
wealth and troops were needed to have any chance of bring stability to Liberia, as well as Sierra 
Leone. When it was clear that Nigeria would no longer be a financial and military backer for 
Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS mission backed down in favor of UN involvement. The ECOWAS 
mission in Guinea-Bissau was rife with problems from lack of adequate troops to the inability to 
properly finance the mission and give ECOMOG the tools it needed. Comparing the outcomes of 
the interventions with and without the presence of the regional hegemon of Nigeria it is certain 
that a regional hegemon or help from an outside power (either a state or international 
organization) is necessary to provide the necessary resources for the interventions to be 
successful.  
Another interesting development was that only as an autocracy was Nigeria willing to 
expand significant numbers of troops and substantial financial support for the ECOWAS 
interventions. Once they moved to a democracy it was clear that Nigerian troops and funds were 
needed to help stabilize Nigeria and solve the problems at home. What was clear about the Sierra 
Leone mission and in part the Liberian mission was that the Nigerian initiative to create stable 
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democracies was based on a desire to improve the international standing of Nigeria. As an 
autocracy, Nigeria was guilty of several human rights abuses and repression of her own people, 
by turning the attention of the international community toward the successful democratic and 
peacekeeping efforts of Nigeria; it delayed the inevitable sanctions and pressures for reform.  
 The ECOWAS interventions also had strong member cohesiveness with all members of 
ECOWAS aware of the interventions before they occurred. There was discussion and debate for 
the best course of action in all of the interventions and there was majority support for the 
interventions. This policy agreement whether through national interests or a common goal for the 
region and the organization, helped to provide a strong and unified front for the ECOWAS 
interventions. It also paved the way for the interventions to get support from organizations like 
the UN when it was needed.  
 It is also of note that democracy was never the main initiative in any of the interventions. 
They were driven by national interest and the desire to maintain stability in the region. 
Democracy only came as an outcropping of the desire for stability, with power sharing and 
democratic regimes being the only chance at bringing peace to states torn by conflict. In Liberia, 
few thought that Charles Taylor would be an effective leader, but the belief among Liberians and 
ECOWAS was that Taylor winning the election was the best chance at stability. It was a 
commonly held belief that if Charles Taylor did not win, the NPFL would continue fighting in 
Liberia. Therefore, the focus was not on the rule of law, on the electoral process or even human 
rights to an extent, the focus was on bringing stability to Liberia and to the region. Democracy 
was just seen as the best pathway to that desired stability.  
 The problems with the ECOWAS efforts to bring stability and democracy to states in 





were no mechanisms in place for such initiatives. The strong and clearly defined institutions did 
not exist in any of the case studies and this deficit caused problems throughout all three 
interventions. In all three ECOMOG operations there was no clear line of authority for the troops 
and no strategic or logistic efforts in place by ECOWAS. All military decisions were made by 
whichever state was leading the intervention, and it was clear that Nigeria was one of the few 
states that had the experience and the means to run the large intervention forces. However, 
Nigerian forces were also very corrupt and were not easy to trust, as was evidenced by Nigerian 
generals stealing from ECOWAS funds and billing the missing money as ECOMOG expenses. 
While this lack of strong and clearly defined institutions did not prevent the intervention from 
bringing eventual stability and democracy to Liberia, eventually the help of the UN was needed 
to solve the problems that were left by the lack of structure within ECOWAS.  
 There are three very important lessons to be taken from the interventions by ECOWAS. 
The first was that they were poorly planned and poorly implemented. The second was that while 
they were messy and may have been the cause of conflict rather than the solution, they were able 
to bring a sense of stability to conflict ridden areas when the rest of the international community 
was unwilling to intervene. The final lesson is that with many ECOWAS states still struggling to 
build their economies and their military, it is necessary for a strong hegemon like Nigeria to be 
involved in peacekeeping missions. Therefore, a regional hegemon proved to be essential to the 
success of ECOWAS interventions and a strong hegemon helped to fill the gap that was left by 
the lack of strong institutions.  
 Today ECOWAS has revamped their institutions and created a new structure for many of 
their operations. Several states are also on the road to becoming stronger states with the ability to 





interventions to really be able to bring stability. The difference in ECOMOG force size with and 
without the aid of Nigeria was thousands, and the equipment supplied to the Nigerian backed 






CHAPTER SIX: SADC INTERVENTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
 
Background to the DRC Conflict 
The crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was the culmination of years of 
conflict and strife leading all the way back to its brutal colonial roots. The DRC was colonized 
originally as the personal property of King Leopold and he exploited the people and resources of 
the DRC with extreme brutality. When independence was granted to the Congo, its people had 
had no real access to education or the ability to run their own government; there was no 
preparation for independence at all.
123
  
 This led to a power struggle within the country. The elected Prime Minister Patrice 
Lumumba had to seek help from the UN to secure his borders and bring stability to the country 
that had been re-named Zaire in 1971. The UN was slow to respond, causing Lumumba to turn to 
the Soviet Union. This turned Zaire into a Cold War battleground with the Western states placing 
Mobutu Sese Seko in power. Mobutu ruled the country with deep pockets, surrounding himself 
with his followers and preventing any political opposition from forming against him.
124
  
 By 1980 the people were starving and there was little that could be done. Eighty percent 
of the country’s resources went toward the presidency, causing Mobutu to be one of the richest 
men of the world and president of one of the poorest countries in the world.
125
 By 1990, the Cold 
War was drawing to a close and Western states could no longer ignore the way Mobutu was 
ruling the country. Mobutu was forced to make concessions such as allowing political parties to 
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form and reducing the repression of his citizenry. However, the changes were not enough and 
soon Western countries began refusing aid to Zaire.  
 In 1992, troops were threatening mutiny and Mobutu was forced to buy currency from 
Germany in order to pay them. These practices led to hyperinflation and the Zairian dollar at the 
time was valued at $110 million to $1 US dollar.
126
 The loyalty of the army declined drastically 
as unpaid troops refused to remain under Mobutu. The situation in Zaire worsened further as 
hundreds of thousands of refugees from the 1994 Rwanda genocide flooded into the country.
127
 
These issues were compounded by the fact that Mobutu was diagnosed with prostate cancer and 
was forced to neglect the state even further to seek treatment. The weak state and dismal 
situation finally allowed a rebel movement to form after 30 years of Mobutu’s kleptocracy. 
 In 1996, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) was 
formed and led by Joseph Kabila. The group declared war on the nearly defunct Mobutu regime 
as Mobutu sought cancer treatment in Europe. Kabila’s main goal was to seize power for himself 
and rather than pursue an altruistic goal of saving Zaire.
128
 The ADFL received financial and 
military help from neighboring Rwanda, Uganda and Angola and gained significant ground in 
Zaire by the time Mobutu returned in December of 1996.  
 While Mobutu was able to rally his forces and delay an offensive it was clear by May 
1997 that the country was lost to the ADFL. Mobutu fled to Morocco and Kabila renamed the 
country the Democratic Republic of Congo and declared himself president. Kabila remained a 
strong ally to Rwanda and Uganda. Rwanda intervened because the new government following 
the genocide was unhappy with Mobutu’s support of the Hutu troops who were responsible for 
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the killing. The troops were not only allowed to remain in eastern Zaire but they were being 
supplied with weapons by Mobutu and his government. Soon these forces began launching 
attacks against Rwanda from their camps within Zaire.
129
 This caused the new Rwandan 
government to do whatever it took to remove Mobutu from power.
130
  
 Kabila proved to be little better than Mobutu, not only in his leadership of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo but in his treatment of Rwanda. The troops who had helped Kabila win the 
country refused to leave once Kabila was in power. Having Rwandan troops in the capital caused 
many Congolese to believe that Kabila was nothing more than a pawn of foreign powers, so 
Kabila knew they had to leave.
131
 In July of 1998, he accused his Rwandan ally of plotting 
against him and forced all Rwandan troops out of the country. 
This led to a new rebel group: the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) 
which formed with the support of Rwanda and Uganda.  By August of 1998, the rebel forces 
were seizing several areas in eastern DRC and moved quickly through the country, making use 
of captured aircraft. Kabilia knew that his chances for survival rested on foreign assistance, but 
this time he could not call on Rwanda or Uganda for help. Instead he turned to the SADC and 




Reasons for SADC Intervention 
 When the conflict in the DRC broke out, the SADC was structurally divided. The SADC 
was chaired by President Mandela from South Africa and the Organ on Politics, Defense and 
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Security Co-Operation was headed by President Mugabe from Zimbabwe. The Organ was 
allowed to act autonomously from the SADC and did not have to get permission from the SADC 
chair or even a majority of states in order to make decisions. This caused a great deal of tension 
between Mandela and Mugabe who both struggled to have more control in the SADC. The chair 
of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Co-Operation was meant to rotate annually, a 
process which stopped when Mugabe took the chair. Once he was in control, Mugabe would 
often make decisions on behalf of the SADC without consulting the other states, or even all of 
the members of the Organ.
133
 This was due to the power granted to the Organ to function 
independently at the Summit level, which was the highest level of authority within the SADC. 
 On August 7,
 
1998, a month after the rebellion began Mugabe held a meeting in Victoria 
Falls with the heads of state for Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Zambia. Mandela, despite being President of South Africa and chair of the SADC was not 





, Mugabe declared that the SADC had unanimously decided to answer Kabilia’s 
appeal for help, despite that fact that only seven of the SADC’s states attended the meeting. 
Mandela’s spokesperson stated that the meeting held by Mugabe could not have been done under 
the auspices of the SADC.
135
  
 South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, and Tanzania all sought a peaceful and diplomatic 
solution to the crisis in the DRC. On the 23
rd
 of August, Mandela convened an emergency 
summit meeting to discuss the authority of the SADC over the actions of the Organ. Mugabe did 
not attend the meeting, suggesting instead that the OAU must now be enlisted to solve the 
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problem because the SADC was too divided.
136
 Angola and the DRC also refused to attend the 
summit meeting and Mozambique stated that they would not send troops to the DRC without the 
support of the SADC and the OAU.
137
  
 The states that decided to intervene in the DRC did so under OAU and UN protocols 
allowing collective self-defense in response to an armed attack against a member of the 
organization. There was also the SADC protocol on the use of collective action in the event of an 
attempted coup against a member state.  However, this protocol was never voted on by the 
SADC and was only presented by South Africa to the SADC.
138
 The establishment of stability 
and security for the region was the main goal of those who decided that military intervention was 
necessary, but it was also the goal of those who wished for a peaceful solution.  
 Similar to the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, there were issues of national interest for 
the states that chose to intervene, as well as for the states that chose to seek a peaceful resolution. 
Mugabe’s reasons for spearheading the SADC intervention were both political and economic. 
When the conflict broke out with Rwandan and Ugandan forces supporting the rebels and 
Western support for the allies, it was seen as disrespectful to Mugabe. Mugabe felt that he was 
the leading player in southern Africa and therefore the imperialist tendencies and territorial 
aggression were not permitted without his approval or inclusion.
139
  
 Kabila also made it clear that there would be rewards for the countries that came to his 
aid. When Mugabe decided to intervene in the DRC, his country’s economy was already 
crumbling. Zimbabwe spent US$3 million a month on intervention in the DRC and while this 
                                               
136 (Berman & Sams, 2000, p. 178) 
137 (Nathan, 2012, p. 88) 
138 (Nathan, 2012) 





accelerated the economic decline it did not come without benefits, especially for Zimbabwe’s 
elite. Hundreds of acres of farmland were handed over to Zimbabwe; contracts with mining 
companies and even mining concessions were given directly to the troops to pay for their 
support.
140
 As the conflict continued, Kabila paid for Zimbabwe’s continued assistance with 
more mining concessions and contracts, as well as allowing the Zimbabwean troops to take from 
the land that they occupied.
141
  
 Angola also had its own reasons for intervening in the conflict. Like Mugabe and 
Zimbabwe, there was a personal reason for Angola’s intervention. On the eve of Angola’s fight 
for independence in 1975, Katangan soldiers changed the tide of the revolution and ensured that 
Angola would gain its independence. This was a debt of which Kabila’s minister, a Katangan, 
was quick to remind Angola.
142
 Angola was also unhappy with the fact that its two allies, 
Uganda and Rwanda, had invaded a country nearby without consulting them.
143
 This was enough 
reason for Angola to support the intervention and send troops.  
 Namibia was the third major player within the SADC to support military intervention in 
the DRC. The biggest reason that Namibia chose to intervene was because they wanted to build 
ties with its ally Angola.
144
 They also owed a debt to Angola for allowing the South West Africa 
People’s Organization (SWAPO) to build camps in southern Angola in 1966.
145
  
 All three countries signed the Luanda Mutual Defense Pact with the DRC in 1998, which 
required them to come to the aid of any signatory that was attacked. This only added to the 
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reasons why they pushed for a military intervention by the SADC. However they were unable to 
find unanimous or even tacit support from the other members.  
 South Africa and other members of the SADC called for an immediate ceasefire and a 
move toward peace talks on the political future of the DRC. The Summit meeting of August 23, 
1998, ended with member states agreeing that Mandela should work with the OAU to find a 
peaceful solution to the conflict, including the withdrawal of all foreign troops and movement 
toward national reconciliation. There was also a push to try and merge the initiatives of the 
Summit meeting with the decisions of the Organ.
146
 On August 31, 1998, the UN issued a similar 
statement about a peaceful solution to the DRC conflict.
147
  
 The reason why South African leaders became so involved with the conflict was their 
belief that regional stability was necessary for South Africa to build stronger trade relations and a 
stronger economy. As a post-apartheid country there was not only a great disparity of wealth but 
a struggling economy and high rates of poverty, all of which South Africa hoped to remedy 
through a strong economic community.
148
 There was also a concern of spillover of the conflict 
into South African territory, a concern that was very real since one of the reasons why the Congo 
conflict persisted was spillover from the 1994 Rwandan genocide.  
 A month later Mandela and the SADC changed their stance and announced that the 
organization unanimously supported the military intervention by Zimbabwe, Angola and 
Namibia. While Mandela still wanted to work toward a ceasefire and peaceful talks, he hoped 
that by supporting the military intervention that unity could return to the SADC.
149
 However, the 
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SADC remained split as the organization tried to endorse both the military intervention by 
Zimbabwe and the peaceful resolution of South Africa. 
 While the SADC continued with their two pronged approach the conflict spiraled further 
out of control. Sudan and Chad joined the forces supporting Kabilia, while Burundi joined forces 
with Rwanda and Uganda. By the end of 1998, the conflict in the DRC had become Africa’s 
largest war with nine different countries directly involved in the fighting and the SADC 
struggling to bring stability and peace to the region.  
 
The SADC in the DRC 
The divisions within the SADC meant that only a limited number of SADC states 
provided troops or financial support for the military intervention. The majority of SADC 
resources went toward negotiating peace settlements and finding a way to stop the spread of the 
war. The military intervention occurred first and was the first step in forcing the SADC’s hand in 
becoming involved with the crisis.  
Once Mugabe decided to intervene, Zimbabwean troops and their allies entered the DRC, 
knowing that they could not trust any of the soldiers within the DRC, including those who 
claimed to still be part of the national army. This meant that protecting Kabila would have to be 
done by the Zimbabwean troops. It was also apparent that there were several other international 
players trying to get control of parts of the DRC in the middle of the conflict. Mugabe wanted to 
make sure that these actions were seen as illegitimate while the actions taken by Zimbabwe and 





SADC’s backing it would show which force was the right one for the Western nations and the 
people of the Congo to support.
150
  
The first goal was to create a fast advance that would push the Rwandan forces out of the 
capital so as to restore a semblance of government and order to the country. The rebel forces had 
taken control of key parts of Kinshasa and were attempting to starve the city and force Kabila to 
step down, so regaining control of Kinshasa was imperative. To do this Zimbabwe, Angola and 
Namibia entered the country with tanks, armored vehicles, helicopters and aircraft to create a 
force that would easily take back the country.  
The initial skirmishes between SADC forces and the rebels quickly revealed that the 
“rebels” were really highly trained and organized Rwandan and Ugandan troops. As Mugabe 
hoped, the people of the Congo quickly rallied to the side of the SADC forces, partially because 
they were angry at the atrocities committed by the Rwandan Tutsi occupiers. The initial phase of 
the intervention was successful. Kabila was placed under protection and Kinshasa and important 
neighboring cities were secured. Zimbabwean electricians were able to return power to the city, 
which had been powerless for over a month due to rebel forces taking over the hydroelectric 
dam. The airport was also reopened for both commercial and normal operations.
151
  
These efforts brought an initial sense of stability to the DRC and its government. It also 
prompted the conflict to grow even larger as Rwanda and Uganda refused to back down. Six 
national armies and everything under their control from tanks and helicopters to rockets and 
fighter planes came to a head on Congolese soil. With SADC forces and Rwanda, Uganda and 
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The stalemate was the opportunity that the proponents of a peaceful solution had been 
waiting for. While there had been more than twenty attempts to broker a peace agreement by the 
SADC, they all failed, because neither side would agree to peace.
153
 The Lusaka Peace 
Agreement was negotiated on July 10, 1999 and it called for an end to the conflict, with foreign 
troops leaving the Congo and rebel forces disarming. It also called for a new government and 
democratic elections to be held. A month after the agreement was signed; fighting broke out once 
again, this time between Rwandan and Ugandan forces. As efforts toward a ceasefire continued, 
both countries began sponsoring rebel groups led by warlords who took over areas of lawless 
east DRC. For its own right, Rwanda had little reason to leave the Congo, with reports estimating 
that at the height of the war $250 million in Congolese mineral profits went to the Rwandan 
army and allied businesses.
154
 Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda since 2000, even called the 
intervention in the Congo “self-sustaining” leaving plenty to gain at little cost for Rwanda.
155
  
The situation was similar for the other states involved in the conflict. While Zimbabwe 
was suffering from a disintegrating economy it still saw a benefit to spending $3 million a month 
on the Congo intervention.  When the Lusaka agreement was signed, profits for the SADC 
countries were slowing down and even Zimbabwe admitted that it was time for a political 
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 However, the fighting was ongoing, even as efforts to keep the capital safe and build 
a new government continued.  
In 2001, Kabila was assassinated and succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila, who called for 
multilateral peace talks headed by the UN to ensure that the terms of the Lusaka ceasefire 
agreement were met.
157
 By June 2003, all foreign forces, with the exception of Rwanda had 
pulled out of the country. As the DRC was moving toward democracy and few SADC states 
were willing to continue the expensive intervention, the SADC pulled out of the country. In 
2006, the first multiparty elections were held and Joseph Kabila was elected president.  
Despite the progress, fighting still affects the Congo as rebel forces headed by warlords 
looking for plunder ravage large portions of the country. The United Nations and the Human 
Rights Watch claim that the rebel forces are still being supported by neighboring countries, 
especially Rwanda.
158
  As late as 2008, people of Congo were dying at a rate of 45,000 persons a 
month, showing that the conflict was nowhere near over.
159
 In 2009, Joseph Kabila invited 
Rwandan troops to help hunt down the Hutu rebel groups in the DRC. Even though they were 
successfully able to capture the main leadership, yet the fighting has not stopped.
160
  
The war has displaced millions and has had a death toll of over 5 million, either from 
starvation and illness, or direct killings.
161
 Sexual violence persists, especially in the eastern 
areas of the Congo where rebel forces retain a strong hold. The efforts of the democratic 
government to bring peace and stop the rebel violence remains a struggle, as new rebel groups 
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return to replace the old ones. In 2012, a new rebel group formed from members of the 
Congolese army, which demanded higher pay and better weapons. The DRC accused the rebel 
group of being a front for Rwanda to advance its exploitive enterprises in the country.
162
  With 
renewed conflict in the DRC the SADC has once again pledged troops to help return stability to 
the country and secure stability for the region.  
 
Democracy Before and After Intervention 
 
Figure 4 DRC Polity IV 
Polity IV (2) changes values of -66,-77, and -88 to common Polity IV values. -77 is 
marked as 0, -88 is prorated across the span of the transition.  
Source: (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011) 
 
 
                                               















The DRC currently has a Polity IV rating of 5
163
, which suggests that the government is 
moving toward a more democratic and stable regime. The Polity IV score says nothing of the 
ongoing violence in many regions of the DRC. Before SADC intervention, the DRC had a Polity 
IV rating of -77 all the way back to 1992. Prior to that date, it held a score of -8.
164
 Politically the 
country has progressed but the country’s political and economic stability continues to decline.  
Under Mobutu, the country functioned as little more than a business enterprise for 
Mobutu and his allies. In 1990 under political pressure from the international community 
Mobutu announced that Zaire would move toward democracy. Human Rights Watch reported in 
1992 that there was significant progress in the liberalization of the country as long term political 
detention ceased. There were still reported cases of opposition figures and journalists 
disappearing or of suspicious deaths. Censorship of newspapers and media was decreasing but 




Mobutu continued to centralize his power and to silence his opposition. In February of 
1993, he dismissed the Prime Minister whom he had appointed as head of the transitional 
government and announced that he would not relinquish his firm control over the treasury or the 
armed forces.
166
 Mobutu would not be pressured by Western allies that threatened sanctions if 
Mobutu did not step down.  
Under the new government that was created in 2006 following years of peace initiatives 
by the SADC and UN, there has been improvement in civil rights issues. However, 2006 was 
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marred by several problems, including a boycott by the opposition.
167
 The public accepted the 
election largely because of the international influence by making sure that the elections bought 
the peace and stability that they promised.  
The elections did not completely turn the tide as the 2012 report from Transparency 
International put the DRC as 160
th
 out of 176 countries, with a score of 21.
168
 The Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation rates the DRC government as 51
st 
out of 52 African countries.
169
  
The 2011 elections elicited numerous calls of illegitimacy by the opposition as Joseph 
Kabala was re-elected. The Carter Center observed the 2011 elections and found numerous 
irregularities such as voter inflation in areas loyal to Kabila and voter suppression in areas 
supportive of the opposition. In some areas loyal to Kabila, voter turnout was 99 to 100 percent, 
a turn out that the Carter Center disputes, saying that 100% turnout is impossible when few 
streets are paved and every vote is for Kabila.
170
  
The SADC left the DRC with little stability and only a semblance of democracy. While 
the Polity IV score has improved, the conditions in the DRC for the general population have not. 
There are more political freedoms and civil rights, nevertheless the government continues to 
maintain a firm hold on state power and limiting the ability of the people to have their voices 
heard.  
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Other SADC Interventions 
Like ECOWAS there were few instances where the majority of SADC states approved of 
substantial military intervention. Lesotho and Madagascar are the only other cases of direct 
military intervention by SADC states into another state. However, it is important to note that one 
of the most telling cases on SADC intervention is Zimbabwe, a state that despite human rights 
abuses, electoral concerns and extreme repression never experienced the strong arm of the 
SADC. The Madagascar intervention has not yet reached its conclusion, however the effects of 
action in Lesotho and the lack of action in Zimbabwe are well known. 
 
Lesotho 
The Lesotho intervention was unique and unexpected because it occurred only a month 
after the intervention into the DRC, and it was spear headed by South Africa. The reasons why 
South Africa chose to intervene militarily in Lesotho after adamantly criticizing the use of 
military force in the DRC are unclear. In fact, much like the DRC intervention, the Lesotho 
intervention occurred without the direct consent of the members of the SADC. 
In 1994, King Letsie III suspended the constitution and dissolved the administration of 
Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle. This action effectively became a royal coup as the constitutional 
government of Lesotho no longer existed. Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe condemned 
the coup and South Africa responded by deploying troops to the Lesotho border. The show of 
force by South Africa was enough for King Letsie to reinstate the government and abdicate this 





Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe decided to become the guarantors of Lesotho 
stability from that point onward. So when discontent erupted over national elections in 1998, the 
newly elected Prime Minister Paklitha Mosisili wrote to the SADC about the impending coup. 
South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe were quick to respond but South Africa 
supplied the majority of troops and the logistical coordination for the intervention to prevent the 
coup. 
South Africa claimed that the intervention was under SADC auspices, claiming SADC 
protocol about not allowing coups d’état. However, the protocol to not allow coups d’état was 
only proposed by South Africa and never approved by the SADC, nor was any aspect of South 
Africa’s intervention into Lesotho approved by the SADC.
171
 There was little discussion about 
the situation in Lesotho within the SADC prior to the intervention and the most that was done 
was to set up a committee to find out whether or not the 1998 elections were fraudulent.  
The intervention into Lesotho was met with unexpected resistance by the Lesotho army 
which killed several South African soldiers and their allies. The fighting caused Lesotho to erupt 
into a state of anarchy with public demonstrations against the intervention. The demonstrations 
led to a virtual sacking of the capital and thousands of people were displaced. The initial 
operation into Lesotho was filled with strategic and tactical errors and was seen as a military and 
political disaster.
172
 The situation became a huge embarrassment for South Africa. 
The failure of the mission was largely due to the fact that South Africa still had a fledging 
government. At only four years old, the African National Congress (ANC) had not yet created a 
political and strategic coherence between state departments. The decision-making procedures 
                                               
171 (Tavares, 2011, pp. 158-159) 





within the military were also ad hoc and rudimentary as the new government had very little 
experience with effective military operations.  
Despite the criticisms over the failure of the initial operation and the justification for the 
intervention, South Africa continued to play a peacekeeping role in Lesotho. South Africa was 
able to facilitate negotiations between the parties and eventually and agreement was reached 
regarding the disputed elections. The intervention troops remained until May 1999, when a new 
electoral system was in place. Successful elections were held in 2002. 
The reasons behind the South African military intervention into Lesotho are not entirely 
clear, given the rejection of Zimbabwe’s intervention into the DRC just a month earlier. Bringing 
stability to Lesotho was part of South Africa’s goal of bringing stability to the region in order to 
boost their own economic growth, but military intervention was not part of the peaceful 
initiatives of South Africa. However, there was a significant caveat to the Lesotho conflict in that 
Lesotho Highlands Water Project was the largest series of dams in Africa. It provided a steam of 
income to Lesotho while sending water to South Africa’s central province, which included 




While there were several reasons for South Africa to become involved in Lesotho, the 
reasons to intervene in Zimbabwe were far less compelling. Therefore, neither the South Africa 
nor other states within the SADC were willing to intervene in the Zimbabwe crisis.  
 
                                               






 The issues with Zimbabwe came to a head in 2000, but they were boiling under the 
surface for decades. In February of 2000, the ruling party Zimbabwe National Union Patriotic 
Front (Zanu-PF) lost a constitutional referendum, the first defeat since 1980. The defeat came 
largely due to the rise of an opposition party the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The 
constitutional referendum would have allowed President Robert Mugabe to remain in power and 
would give immunity to Mugabe’s government and security forces for any illegal acts committed 
while in office. It also allowed for the government to seize any land without paying for the land 
itself, only improvements on the land.  
 Following the vote, Zimbabwean war veterans who were struggling under severe poverty 
but were ignored by the government began invading and occupying white owned farmed. The 
Zimbabwean government supported the occupation and began its own program of land seizures, 
despite the vote against it. The international community responded with tough sanctions that 
threatened the economy and the stability of Zimbabwe.  
 The SADC responded by supporting the “land reform” program of Zimbabwe, stating 
that it was simply a way of redistributing land. At the time, 1% of the population owned 70% of 
the best arable land in Zimbabwe. A South African foreign affairs official also supported the 
occupation of farms by veterans as an understandable response to Britain’s failure to fund the 
land redistribution program. 
 Even as refugees streamed across the borders of SADC states and the economic situation 
became even more dire, the SADC leaders refused to see a problem in Zimbabwe. In December 





issues affecting the country, found that the situation was improving. They even rejected the grim 
view of Zimbabwe that was presented by the international media, even as reports of violence 
against MDC members were well known. In 2002 a SADC summit communique went as far as 
to welcome the following actions from the Zanu-PF regime: the respect for human rights, the 
commitment to investigating any claims of political violence and the commitment to fair 
elections and the rule of law.  
 However, Mugabe ignored the diplomatic requests by the SADC and the SADC 
continued to act complacent in light of continuing repression. In 2005, the Zanu-PF won 
parliamentary elections by a landslide. Observers from AU, SADC and South Africa endorsed 
the elections as being the will of the people, even as the International Crisis Group reported the 
government’s systematic use of propaganda, violence, electoral manipulation, targeted 
disenfranchisement and abuse of humanitarian relief.
174
  
 The situation continued to deteriorate and by 2007, inflation in Zimbabwe was anywhere 
from 7,600 percent to 13,000 percent. Government repression of opposition was rampant as 
MDC members were imprisoned, tortured and killed. Political rallies were outlawed and nearly a 
quarter of the population had fled the country.
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 President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa was put 
in charge of mediations between the Zanu-PF and the MDC, but it became apparent to the MDC 
and even the international community that Mbeki was biased toward the Zanu-PF government 
and Mugabe.  
 Despite the problems mediation was able to bring election reform and new elections in 
2008. When it came down to a runoff election between Mugabe and MDC leader Tsvangirai, 
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Tsavangirai pulled out of the election. The political repression and violent threats made it 
impossible for Tsvangirai to continue his campaign, allowing Mugabe to win by a landslide. The 
international community found the election fraudulent and only the SADC continued to support 
the Mugabe regime. Mbeki continued his mediations, however, and this led to a coalition 
government in February 2009. The coalition placed Mugabe as President and Tsvangirai as 
Prime Minister.  
 There was no pressure for Mugabe to truly bring Tsvangirai and the MDC into a true 
partnership, so the Zanu-PF continued to maintain most of the power within Zimbabwe. 
Tsvangirai and the MDC had few options with a mediator that was bias toward Mugabe and a 
party that was severely weakened by years of repression. The mediation did little to inspire 
cooperation between the two parties and it continues to simply be a way for Mugabe to gain 
legitimacy within the international community.  
 Due to the divisions within the SADC about how to handle the situation in Zimbabwe, 
more was not done. There was little initiative to hold Zimbabwe to the respect for human rights, 
the rule of law and for the democratic process by the SADC. The reasons why SADC states 
chose to support Mugabe and his presidency over the goals and ambitions in the SADC treaty 
were largely due to the norms of state solidarity and anti-imperialism.
176
 There was little effort to 
intervene on behalf of human rights and democracy.  
 
                                               






The SADC differed from ECOWAS in that it planned to have some sort of institution to 
address security concerns. However, like ECOWAS there were few mechanisms in place for 
how any interventions would be handled. The SADC did not have any interventions that 
included at least agreement for military intervention from a majority of member states.  
Both the SADC military interventions into Lesotho and the DRC did not even consult the 
entire membership of the SADC before beginning the intervention. In both cases it was merely a 
handful of states operating on behalf of national interests and claiming SADC mandate after the 
fact. National interests were the driving force behind the SADC interventions, and the dominant 
concern for the major players in the interventions was stability.  
The lack of intervention into Zimbabwe showed a desire to maintain status quo. Many 
SADC states were not willing to act against the established Zimbabwe government, especially 
when Mugabe had been such a dominant player in SADC politics. Even when it became clear 
that Zimbabwe was facing economic collapse and severe human rights abuses, the threat to 
stability of the region was not enough to convince SADC states to go against the status quo. The 
blind spot of President Thabo Mbeki and the rest of the SADC toward the repression and abuses 
committee by Mugabe were nothing short of shocking to the international community.
177
  
The SADC also had few mechanisms in place to secure compliance to the Treaty by 
member states. While there was the ability to impose sanctions or suspend states, there were no 
circumstances in place for when such things should happen. There was also no unbiased reports 
given to the SADC about the state of affairs in Zimbabwe and it was apparent that the 
                                               





organization refused to believe the reports in the international media.
178
 The lack of 
accountability mechanisms within the SADC prevented interventions from being a joint 
operation rather than just matters of national interest.  
When the SADC was founded there was a strong emphasis on the necessity of policy 
agreement, and this proved to be the defining point for both the SADC and ECOWAS. It was 
only when national interest coincided that interventions became operations that involved all 
members of the regional organization. With the SADC, the DRC war was a major threat to the 
stability of the region but there was no discussion among the entire membership about how to 
proceed. The lack of unity and trust among the members prevented the operation from having a 
joint approach. The split approach of the SADC to the DRC crisis would not have been a 
problem if it had been that approach from the start, but the decision of Zimbabwe to intervene 
without consulting all SADC states created distrust throughout the membership. A joint 
operation between Zimbabwe and South Africa would have had a much better chance at bringing 
stability to the DRC. The following operation into Lesotho which did include both South Africa 
and Zimbabwe had better success, if it still was riddled with problems and was also without 
SADC approval.  
The operation of ECOWAS into Liberia may not have been favored by all member states 
but a majority were at least willing to authorize the intervention. As the intervention continued 
and as national interests changed, more and more states were willing to supply troops and 
support. It was common national interests that led to the ECOWAS intervention being more 
successful than intervention attempts by the SADC.   
                                               




































































































































































































































CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
 
The interventions performed by ECOWAS and the SADC are both important because 
they are some of the first initiatives by African organizations to try and bring stability and 
democracy to the region. The ECOWAS intervention into Liberia was the first time that any 
economic community had intervened militarily in a conflict, thus stressing the importance of the 
conflict to the stability of the region. Both interventions had their good and bad points and both 
were started by organizations without a majority membership of democracies.  
What the case studies show is that success is largely based upon common interests. While 
both organizations had member states that wanted peaceful solutions and supported military 
intervention, there was more cohesion on the part of ECOWAS. The split between military and 
diplomatic initiatives of the SADC prevented the intervention from having the forces and the 
power it needed to create a major impact on the DRC.  
Both organizations acted out of a fear of instability and national interests. For ECOWAS 
it was apparent that the region was experiencing instability within several states and the 
problems in Liberia were enough to tip the scales. The instability, regime changes and 
revolutions that occurred in the years following the Liberian intervention show how volatile the 
situation was. The interventions in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau by ECOWAS occurred soon 
after the Liberian intervention and they both had very different results.  
Both the Liberian and DRC interventions were spearheaded by a state that hoped to be 
seen as a regional hegemon. Nigeria and Zimbabwe both wanted to be seen as the dominant 





away from the problems within their own boarders and instead show what they could do for the 
region as a whole.  
What is shown by these case studies is that a regional organization does not have to have 
a majority membership of democracies in order to promote or establish a democratic regime 
within their region. The interventions into Liberia and the DRC were able to establish a state that 
was moving toward an established democracy, however only one intervention brought true 
stability. In fact, one of the reasons why the Liberian intervention was so successful was because 
the autocratic regimes or states in transition, knew that their hold on power was tenuous. 
Reducing the conflict in the region was essential to securing what little stability they had over 
their own state, including using the intervention as way to get rid of any potential rebel threats in 
the military.  
 
Can African Regional Organizations Promote Stability and Democracy? 
The focus of this thesis was to determine whether African regional organizations can 
promote stability and democracy. However, as the case studies showed, initially there was no 
focus on democracy by any of the major states involved in the interventions or within the 
organizations themselves. The only time that democracy was discussed was following the 
intervention and the organization needed a way to maintain the stability that the intervention had 
created.  
While the focus was not on democracy, these interventions did lead to transforming 
autocratic states into democracies. This does only seem to occur when a state is in the middle of 





autocracies. This is shown in the lack of interventions into states with established autocracies, 
but do not threaten the stability of the region, such as Swaziland.  
 
Stability over Democracy 
While democratic tenets are part of the treaties of both organizations, they are not 
enforced to the extent that the treaty suggests. The SADC has yet to place any restrictions on 
Swaziland despite its strongly autocratic regime and Gambia with a Polity IV score of -5 has full 
rights as a member of ECOWAS. What mattered to the autocratic and democratic states of 
ECOWAS and the SADC was not regime type, but stability.  
 At the end of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, the organization was tired of the 
fighting and the maintenance of troops. The main goal was to bring stability to the state and to 
the region so that ECOMOG could pull out and leave Liberia. ECOWAS member states believed 
that a democratic government with free and fair elections was the best way to ensure the stability 
and the lack of a new rebel uprising. Another indication of the desire of ECOWAS to ensure 
stability over democracy was their support of Charles Taylor as the presidential candidate for 
Liberia. It was believed that if Charles Taylor did not win, he would simply rebel again. This 
belief was shared by Liberians as the main reason why they decided to vote for Taylor - they 
hoped it would end the violence.
179
  
 On the part of the SADC, the goal was also stability. The states that favored a peaceful 
solution and those that favored military intervention both wanted stability for the DRC and the 
region. Both South Africa and Zimbabwe, the major players in the SADC wanted to promote 
                                               





stability within their region. Zimbabwe wanted to promote stability as the perceived regional 
hegemon and South Africa wanted stability for better trade relations to boost their economy.  
 The belief that democracies are more stable is not new. The democratic peace theory 
suggests that democracies do not fight with other democracies.
180
 More importantly for these 
case studies, research has shown that democracies are less prone to civil war.
181
 Therefore, states 
and organizations looking to promote stability within their region would have better chances for 
long term peace by creating a democratic government over an autocratic one.  
 In terms of member states within an organization, if stability is the goal then it would be 
understandable why the SADC would not take action against Swaziland, even though the state 
does not have a democratic regime. Research has shown that strongly autocratic regimes, like 
Swaziland, are less likely to experience civil war than intermediate regimes.
182
 Since Swaziland 
has little chance of degenerating into a civil war that could threaten the region, it is more 
important for SADC states to focus on other matters rather than trying to promote democracy 
within Swaziland. The same research concludes that states in transition from autocracy to 
democracy are also more likely to engage in civil war than states that either have strong 
democracies or strong autocracies, so forcing liberalization onto Swaziland might even cause 
instability.  
 Strong democracies are still less likely to experience civil war than strong autocracies, so 
in states where civil war or rebellion is already occurring, it is more beneficial to establish a 
democratic government over an autocratic one.  
                                               
180 (Kant, 1975) 
181 (Myers & Krain, 1997) 





Autocracies and Promoting Democracy 
Contrary to the research of Pevehouse, in African regional organizations autocracies have 
the potential to spur democratic change, even more so than democratic regimes. The 
interventions into conflicts by the SADC and ECOWAS were both spearheaded by autocracies, 
with the exception of the intervention by the SADC into Lesotho.  It was actually because 
Nigeria was an autocracy that it was so important for Liberia and even Sierra Leone to move 
toward democracy.  
As a firmly established autocracy, the government of Nigeria was well known for 
repression of civil rights and for human rights abuses. The international community harshly 
criticized Nigeria and threatened to impose harsh sanctions. Nigeria was barred from meetings of 
the Commonwealth because of the known human rights abuses that were occurring in the 
country. By promoting peacekeeping missions throughout Africa, Nigeria was able to get some 
positive attention and turn the focus of the international community away from what was 
happening inside the country. The goal of promoting democracy within Liberia and Sierra Leone 
was part of an initiative to increase the international opinion of the current state Nigeria and its 
government. Nigeria even used its support of interventions as a way to garner support from other 
states within ECOWAS, as backup against criticisms from the international community. This 
directly contradicts the work of Bueno de Mesquita and Downs whose research suggested that 
Nigeria would never support a transition to democracy in Liberia or any other state.
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In turn, when Nigeria moved toward a civilian and democratic government, it was no 
longer willing to maintain costly interventions in other states. It pulled out of Sierra Leone and 
refused to supply troops or substantial finances toward the Guinea-Bissau intervention. Those 
                                               





resources were needed to solve problems at home. When it was an autocracy, it was easier for 
Nigeria to spare those resources and devote them to causes outside of the state. As a democracy, 
Nigeria no longer had that luxury. This suggests that there are cases where an autocracy would 
be more likely to support democratic transitions in another state than that of a democracy.  
It is also important to note that for the DRC intervention there were more democracies 
within the SADC than any other regime type; therefore the SADC should have been more 
successful in promoting a transition to democracy. In reality, it was the autocracy dominated 
ECOWAS that was more successful in promoting democracy. It was a period of instability and 
transitions to democracy from the ground up that prompted democratic changes within the 
SADC and ECOWAS. This supports the work of Olonisakin, that African regional organizations 
will be transformed by transitions to democracy within the state and not the other way around. 
 
Democracy and Economy 
 Both the SADC and ECOWAS were established as primarily economic regional 
organizations. Their goal was to establish trade arrangements and spur foreign investment in the 
region in order to spur development within member states. Both organizations did include 
aspects of good governance and democracy within their treaties, under the belief that stability 
and democracy where necessary for economic growth in the region.  
 The Liberian crisis created a situation that threatened the stability and the ability of the 
entire region to successfully build their economies and have effective trade relations. This caused 
the crisis to become part of the economic and stability goals of ECOWAS to intervene militarily, 





democracy was not the focus of the intervention at its onset, democracy was always part of the 
goals of the organization within all member states. This seems contradictory for organizations 
that were composed of mostly autocratic regimes.  
 Yet democratic regimes had more to offer for the economic future of both regions than 
autocratic regimes. Not only would more democratic states lead to greater foreign investment as 
Western investors were more likely to invest in democratic regimes than autocratic ones. There 
has also been research that suggests that states with democracies have economic growth that is 
not as affected by corruption as states with autocratic regimes.
184
 The level of corruption within 
autocratic regimes makes it difficult for development efforts to be successful. Evidence of this 
can be seen in how corrupt Nigerian officials and military leaders took money for themselves 
while billing it under ECOWAS expenses for the interventions.   
 
What Are the Necessary Structures and Institutions to Promote Democracy and Stability? 
From the two case studies is apparent that one of the necessary structures for an 
intervention to be successful is a strong mandate and mechanisms in place to run a peacekeeping 
operation. Neither ECOWAS nor the SADC had the necessary structures in place for a 
peacekeeping force to be accountable to the political objectives of the organization. Nor were 
there structures to help the peacekeeping force to work hand in hand with the efforts to forge a 
peace agreement. A direct line of communication between the peacekeeping forces and the 
regional organization is necessary to make sure that the force not only maintains its neutrality 
and ability to be a peacekeeping force, but also to perform ambassadorial duties.  
                                               





The findings in this paper coincide with the work of Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom 
and the work of Hansen, Mitchell and Nemeth who found that member cohesiveness and strong 





Policy Agreement/National Interests 
At the time of its formation one of the core aspects of the SADC was to have policy 
agreement among members. The belief was that only through policy agreement would the 
organization be able to thrive.
186
 This is necessary for any regional organization, that the 
members have similar goals and expectations for the organization. While there was some 
dissention in ECOWAS for each intervention, the majority of states either agreed to the need for 
intervention or directly contributed to the military intervention. For the SADC, there was never a 
majority consensus on how to approach the situations in Lesotho or the DRC. This prevented the 
SADC peacekeeping initiatives from getting the full support of the international community and 
even the full force of the SADC toward the peacekeeping missions. 
 At the heart of every peacekeeping operation by ECOWAS and the SADC were national 
interests by member states. This is yet another reason why policy agreement are so pivotal to the 
success of African regional organizations in particular. With so few states having substantial 
resources to spare, states need to work together to promote stability. Therefore, the national 
interests of the member states need to coincide so that peacekeeping missions will be successful. 
In the case of the ECOWAS interventions, the entire region was unstable and many of the states 
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themselves were only in tentative control, so it was in the national interest of most of the states to 
prevent anything from tipping the scales in the wrong direction. While there were some 
differences in national interests for why each state ultimately decided to support or be a part of 
the intervention, at the core was always stability for themselves and the region.  
 Using Mills methods it is clear that in situations where there was no policy agreement on 
the matter of intervention, the intervention was unable to progress to complete stability and 
democracy. In the cases where there was strong policy agreement such as in the ECOWAS 
interventions, the organization was more likely to succeed in its intervention efforts. However, 
the failure of the intervention in Guinea-Bissau and the necessity for UN help in the Sierra Leone 
intervention, prove that it does take more than just policy agreement for an intervention to be 
successful.  
 The national interests of SADC states in the DRC conflict were also focused on stability. 
More states were involved with the DRC conflict than any other and it was clear that it could 
ruin the potential for stability and trade within the region if the situation was not put under 
control. However, there were also national interests in conflict within SADC. South Africa was 
looking to protect its future trading region, Zimbabwe wanted to be established as a regional 
powerhouse, and both were getting something out of their separate efforts in the conflict. 
Zimbabwe elites were being paid for their assistance in the intervention and South Africa was 
getting positive attention from the international community by seeking a peaceful solution. It was 
not until the stalemate that the national interests of all the parties converged to the point where 
the SADC could present a united initiative toward peace. By then the region was too unstable 





Highly Defined Institutions and a Strong Mandate 
 The biggest problem for ECOMOG in Liberia and it the interventions that followed, was 
a lack of direct communication and structure connecting it to ECOWAS. There was no 
established institution for overseeing or maintaining a peacekeeping force and therefore there 
was little understanding of who the leaders of ECOMOG would report to. The leaders were 
largely on their own for both military and political decisions. This added to the concerns over 
neutrality because the ECOMOG leaders were almost always Nigerian and therefore followed 
the political and military goals of Nigeria. 
 A clearly defined mandate that offers clear rules and guidelines for member states would 
prevent issues such as Zimbabwe within the regional organization. There would be a clearly 
defined consequence for human rights abuses and repression, regardless of the state or leader 
responsible for those crimes. An option for states to air grievances or discuss problems is also 
beneficial to deal with issues where states are not fulfilling their obligations to the organization. 
This is drawn from the work of Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom that suggest that a strong 
organizational mandate on security concerns is pivotal to the success of a regional organization. 
In Africa, where security issues and instability are rampant in many states, the need for a security 
structure within African regional organizations is necessary for lasting success and stability in 
the region.  
 Clear definitions of the institutions are also necessary for the success of a regional 
organization to reach their goals. The poorly defined responsibilities of the Organ and the lack of 
authority of the SADC over the Organ not only caused a rift within the SADC but allowed a few 
states to act militarily under the guise of the SADC. If there is no clear line of authority over all 





manage all of its operations. Following the problems over the DRC, the SADC placed the Organ 
under the authority of Summit and restructured many of the institutions to make all SADC 
operations more effective.  
 Likewise, following the problems within the interventions into Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Guinea-Bissau and the democratic transition of the majority of member states, ECOWAS 
completely transformed its structures and institutions. Now there are clearly defined objectives, 
clear protocols for new initiatives by the organization and methods for states to air grievances or 
complaints. There are institutions to handle the regular operations of the organization, while the 
highest authority remains the Summit which includes all the heads of the member states.  
 These movements toward stronger institutions that are clearly defined and a clear 
mandate have strengthened the reputation of ECOWAS and the SADC within the international 
community. ECOWAS is now seen as a major force within Africa and the strongest regional 
organization on the continent. The SADC has been able to partner with other regional 
organizations and move toward greater economic development within the region. Both of these 
organizations are currently beginning new interventions into member states in conflict, future 
research into the progress and success of these interventions may give insight into how effective 
these improvements are.   
 There are currently no cases of completed interventions by ECOWAS or the SADC under 
the current restructuring of the institutions and protocols. Therefore, it is not possible to see how 
strong institutions and structures would change the likelihood of success by ECOWAS or the 
SADC, until the current interventions under way by both organizations are completed. However, 





seen throughout the interventions by both ECOWAS and the SADC. Using Mills methods and 
analyzing the effects of varying levels of institutionalization from no security structure to a 
poorly defined security structure shows that there is very little difference. Whether nonexistent or 
poorly defined there was no change to the likelihood of success because they caused severe 
problems in both instances.  
 
Hegemon or Strong Leading Power 
The existence of a regional hegemon was also a part of what made the interventions into 
Liberia and Sierra Leone successful. Nigeria was able to fund and supply troops toward the 
peacekeeping operations while still remaining relatively neutral and its actions legitimate by 
working through ECOWAS. Nigeria was also able to use its influence to encourage other states 
to become involved in Liberia as well. The influence of hegemons was also pivotal to the 
interventions by the SADC. Both South Africa and Zimbabwe were major players in the region. 
They were able to influence other states to join in their initiatives and work toward peaceful 
solutions. However, it was when the two hegemons disagreed that problems arose and threatened 
to destroy the entire organization. This shows that regional organizations can become struggles 
for power. As was proven by Mandela and Mugabe as they were unable to work together to find 
solutions because they both wanted control over SADC initiatives.  
The need for a strong hegemon was seen in the ECOWAS interventions into Sierra Leone 
and Guinea-Bissau. Once Nigeria was no longer willing to be a major player in the intervention 
in Sierra Leone it was necessary for the UN to take over the peacekeeping mission in the 





intervention or even contribute troops as it was too focused on internal affairs as part of their 
transition to a democratic government. The mission into Guinea-Bissau was rife with problems 
including a lack of sufficient troops and equipment for a successful intervention. However, 
Nigeria still played a diplomatic role in offering up a place for the peace talks to be held.  
In the SADC intervention into Lesotho, the two major powers of the region were joined 
together. Zimbabwe and South Africa were both working together on the intervention. Despite 
the two hegemons being on the same side, there were still problems and the intervention was 
considered to be an initial embarrassment. While the military intervention was considered 
flawed, the diplomatic efforts and peace talks that were led by South Africa did bring some 
stability and peace to Lesotho. Therefore, a region hegemon is not the sole component needed 
for a successful intervention but as seen in the ECOWAS interventions it can be one factor that 
makes a very big difference in success or failure. The SADC intervention into the DRC may 
suggest that the presence of two states fighting to be regional hegemons may create more 
problems and not be as helpful toward successful intervention as one single hegemon.  
Using Mills methods it is clear that a strong, single hegemon is the strongest predictor of 
success for a regional organization’s attempts at intervention. When Nigeria was not present for 
the Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau interventions there was no chance of success without 
outside involvement. Even when there were two hegemons working together there was not as 
much chance of success for the intervention, when the two hegemons were at odds the 
intervention had even less chance of success. With so many states within African regional 
organizations militarily and financially weak, it is necessary for a regional hegemon or 





The need for a hegemon does lend credence to the realist claim that international 
organizations are mirrors of the balance of power system. Even in African regional organizations 
the regional hegemon dominates the decision making and heads the intervention force because 
they are more powerful and able to do so. However, with the intervention led by two hegemons, 
even when they agreed, it was not a guarantee of success. The intervention by Zimbabwe and 
South Africa into Lesotho was not successful even though both hegemons were in agreement 
over the need for military force in the country.  
 
Were Regional Organizations Successful in their Goals? 
If stability is more important than democracy in African regional organizations, then the 
success of intervention should be measured by the ability to create stability within the state. In 
the case of the ECOWAS intervention into Liberia, it was able to bring some semblance of 
stability to the region. The 1998 intervention brought initial stability to the capital city and was 
eventually able to secure the entire state. When rebels entered the country again and ECOWAS 
was once again called for help, stability was quickly established. Both initiatives required the aid 
and support of the UN, with the UN even taking over ECOWAS forces to control the second 
intervention.  
 Today, Liberia is a poor but stable country. The economy is slowly growing and 
repression and violence within the country is on the decline. There have been two rounds of free 
and fair elections as rated by a number of independent monitors and there have been no 





of stability and democracy, the end result in Liberia might be labeled as a success but it was not 
without its shortcomings.  
 ECOMOG was poorly run and had little political direction from ECOWAS. This did not 
change even in subsequent interventions in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. These interventions 
though poorly run and mismanaged, did bring some semblance of stability and in both cases the 
countries moved toward a more liberalized regime. However, in the case of Guinea-Bissau 
fighting continued on the edges of the country even as ECOWAS was pulling out to give control 
to the new government. Sierra Leone continued to struggle for stability within its borders when a 
joint effort by the UN, and the United States training troops from Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal to 
help with the UN mission occurred.
187
 It was only after this joint effort that tentative peace and 
stability came to Sierra Leone.  
 While there were significant problems with the interventions and they lasted several 
years, they were still able to bring countries in chaos to some semblance of stability. The biggest 
issue that ECOWAS and their forces must change for the future is that in each case of ECOWAS 
intervention there was knowledge of other ECOWAS states lending support to the other side.
188
   
 In terms of an SADC intervention, there has yet to be a united effort by the SADC to 
bring stability to another state. The two major interventions by the SADC have been into Lesotho 
and the DRC. The intervention in to Lesotho was spearheaded by South Africa and was largely 
hailed as a disaster and an embarrassment to South Africa. The intervention included Botswana, 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and was met with resistance from both the Lesotho army and the 
people of Lesotho. The country largely disintegrated into chaos.  
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 The failure in Lesotho is understood due to the fact that South Africa was still a fledging 
country and the operation into Lesotho was poorly managed and poorly thought out. It was also 
criticized that South Africa so readily deployed military forces in Lesotho a mere month after 
speaking out against the military intervention into the DRC. It was only after South Africa 
abandoned the failed military operation that diplomatic efforts were successful. 
 The DRC intervention was also unsuccessful in bringing stability to the country. Even 
after the establishment of a democratic government, the country continued to be fraught with 
violence and extreme poverty. The elections that were held were found to be suspect and full of 
problems as reported by several election observers. The success of the second intervention into 
the DRC has yet to be seen.  
 ECOWAS is now involved in an intervention into Mali and the SADC has moved into 
Madagascar in the hopes of bringing stability to both of these countries. These new interventions 
have only begun in 2012, so it will be a new test to see if the restructured institutions and greater 
stability of the organizations will lead to greater success.  
 
Limitations of African Regional Organizations 
 None of the interventions by ECOWAS or the SADC would have had a chance of being 
successful without the support of the UN and western allies. Even when the western nations were 
unable to send troops or intervene themselves, they offered political and financial support to the 
operations. In the case of the UN, a truly neutral force was introduced to help with peace 





 African nations do not have the resources or the economies to intervene militarily without 
the support of the west. Even with the recent progress of ECOWAS and SADC toward creating a 
growing economic community, the interventions planned into the DRC, Mali and Madagascar 
will depend on support from the AU and the UN. It will be a very long time before these 
organizations will be able to run a peacekeeping mission on their own, as it was shown in the 
case of the military intervention into the DRC. Zimbabwe and her allies had very little 
international support and even with the incentives from Kabila, the economy of Zimbabwe has 
yet to recover from that expense.  
 ECOWAS and the SADC also have had several issues with neutrality. Their states are 
always very close to the situation and this was detrimental to the interventions. There were states 
that choose to support the rebel forces rather than ECOWAS forces during the Liberian 
intervention.
189
 There are long standing grudges, alliances and even the hope for monetary gain 
that can prevent African states from being neutral in their endeavors or truly working for peace. 
Several of the peace agreements that were attempted by the SADC for the DRC conflict failed 
because of neutrality issues. The states involved in the military intervention had too much to gain 
from the continuing conflict. 
 The assistance of UN monitoring groups and support can help African regional 
organizations present a neutral front and give them a stronger argument for peace agreements. 
Western nations will have to continue to fund interventions, but they will have the benefit of not 
needing to use their own forces. The United States was happy to train African forces to be sent 
on UN missions, because it reduced the need for American or western troops to intervene. There 
have also been instances where African heads of state will only allow African peacekeeping 
                                               





forces into their country, and this is where partnerships between the UN and African regional 
organizations will continue to be beneficial.  
 Even with their limitations, African regional organizations offer an at home approach to 
conflict. They are African and know better than any other region the problems they face and the 
obstacles that must be overcome in order to reach stability. Western states support the idea of 
“African solutions African problems” because it reduces the strain on their own resources and it 
prevents the need to deploy troops in Africa, a sensitive topic since the failure of western 
peacekeeping missions in the nineties.  
 African regional organizations can offer rough and ready opportunities for quickly 
establishing stability and movements toward a stable regime. Both the SADC and ECOWAS 
were able to bring security to the capitals of the countries where they intervened within a matter 
of months; lasting stability however was a much harder issue. They have the ability of building 
economic communities that may one day have the power to enforce economic constraints on 
member states in response to human rights or political abuses. ECOWAS has not only 
established free trade arrangements but free movement of citizens of member states between all 
other states. They have created an investment bank that spurs development projects within all 15 
of its member states. The SADC has created a growing economic community with ties to other 
communities to offer unparalleled trading options to encourage growth.  
 African regional organizations need to develop strong institutions and mechanisms for 
the deployment of peacekeeping troops and initiatives if they are going to continue to intervene 
in member states. The existence of a single regional hegemon has proven to be helpful, if 





national interests of the member states will need to coincide for any initiative toward stability or 
democracy to be successful.  
 Currently the value of African organizations is seen in their ability to respond to conflict 
and stabilize the region. Stability is the goal for both ECOWAS and the SADC because that is 
the only way for their regional trade agreements to be successful. At the core of both 
organizations is the belief that only through the growth of their economies can development and 
lasting stability come to the region. Until the economic goals of African regional organizations 
are met, they will not be able to respond to conflict entirely on their own. They will always need 
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